*This article also appears as a chapter in the 2024 KCIS Conference volume that was published in Sept. 2025

On October 24, 2024, the Royal Military College of Canada’s History Department sponsored a panel at the Canadian Army Staff College, Fort Frontenac Officers Mess, in Kingston, Ontario. The aim of the event was to discuss Canadian governmental activities in Kandahar, Afghanistan from 2010 to 2011. This discussion occurred in tandem with the launch of former Ambassador Tim Martin’s book, Unwinnable Peace: Untold Stories of Canada’s Mission in Afghanistan.[2] Dr. Katherine Rossy, a Royal Military College professor and Deputy Director of Research at the Centre for International and Defence Policy, moderated the discussion. Dr. Howard Coombs, the counterinsurgency advisor for that mission, now a Royal Military College professor and Director of the Centre of International and Defence Policy, participated in the panel. Other members included Major-General (Retired) Dean Milner, then the Canadian commander; Ambassador (Retired) Tim Martin, who served as the last Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK); Major General (Retired) Ahmed Habibi, who was the Afghan commander; and Mr. Amal Mohammad-Din, then the senior Language and Cultural Advisor. In attendance, and adding a great deal to the event, was General (Retired) Walter Natynczyk, who served as the Chief of Defence Staff at that time. What ensued was a lively and informative event that marked the first time the group reunited since their experiences during the last combat rotation of Canada’s most prolonged active conflict (2001–2014). The conversation revolved around how well the activities conducted by the Canadian mission met the human security objectives laid out by the Canadian government as part of the Alliance mission.

During 2010–2011, the Canadian military mission worked alongside Canadian development and foreign affairs officers, as well as other militaries and non-military agencies, to create a whole-of-government approach to the dilemmas posed by the complex counterinsurgency environment.[3] This close collaboration between the military and civilian branches reflects Canada’s commitment to fostering human security in Kandahar, a concept that has gained significant traction in recent decades as a comprehensive framework that extends beyond the mere absence of open violence. Emerging in response to the limitations of traditional national security frameworks that often prioritize state interests, human security shifts the focus to protecting the well-being of individuals and societies. “We needed civilian diplomats and aid workers to go to Afghanistan, to help the Afghans rebuild their country so they would believe in their government and leave the Taliban behind,” Tim Martin points out in his book; “Canada has the best small army in the world, but counterinsurgency is the hardest kind of war to win— killing the enemy is not enough. If we couldn’t help the Afghan people, what were we even doing there?”[4] Martin’s perspective underscores a critical dimension of Canada’s human security goals in Afghanistan. The priority was not solely on defeating the enemy, but on creating the conditions necessary for Afghan communities to thrive. Human security thus encompasses the protection of human rights, the promotion of good governance, the guarantee of access to education and healthcare, and the provision of opportunities for individuals to realize their full potential. Understanding the depth and breadth of these priorities is crucial for addressing poverty, fostering economic development, and preventing conflict.[5]

Canada's involvement in Afghanistan can be divided into three phases: a brief combat mission in 2002, a stabilization effort from 2003 to 2004, and provincial reconstruction from 2004 to 2006. By 2006, the mission had evolved into a low-intensity conflict, which resulted in significant Canadian casualties.[6] By 2011, Canada transitioned from combat to providing advice and assistance within the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan, focusing on training Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and supporting governance and development initiatives.[7] This final phase must be understood within the broader context of a NATO-led effort that combined both military and civilian initiatives to secure and stabilize Afghanistan. As Martin emphasizes, “[s]ince the objective was to enable the Afghan government to govern, everything we did kept responsible handover to the Afghan government in mind.”[8] In this vein, Canada’s comprehensive whole-of-government approach uniquely integrated military, diplomatic, humanitarian, and development elements into its program, which distinguished its efforts from those of other NATO partners who adopted their own operational policies and practices. In 2014, Canada’s Afghanistan commitment ended.

Over the course of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan, there were two heavily debated parliamentary votes—one in May 2006 and the other in March 2008—concerning the extension of the mission and its essential character.[9] There was also considerable attention paid to the convening of an independent panel to make recommendations on the future course of the mission in 2007, known as the Manley Report, as well as highly politicized public discourse over the Government’s detainee transfer policy that began in 2007 and continued throughout Canada’s involvement.[10] In his memoir, A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats, and the Politics of War, General Rick Hillier notes that a key outcome of this period of debate in Canadian politics was the development of a defence policy statement that outlined the overarching strategy for using Canada’s military.[11] The Canada First Defence Strategy mandated the Canadian Forces:

[…] to be a fully integrated, flexible, multi-role and combat-capable military, working in partnership with the knowledgeable and responsive civilian personnel of the Department of National Defence. This integrated Defence team will constitute a key element of a whole-of-government approach to meeting security requirements, both domestically and internationally.[12]

This very public political debate, furthermore, created recognition of the breadth and complexity of the Afghan challenge that, in turn, contributed to a substantial evolution in both the strategic whole-of-government coordination framework in Ottawa and the corresponding mission structure and civilian resourcing in Afghanistan. Both the Manley Report and this new defence policy ushered in a new Canadian political perspective on the whole-of-government concept.

As a result, by early 2008, Canadian efforts in Afghanistan were, for the first time, overseen by a Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan, with support from a newly established Afghanistan Task Force within the Privy Council Office. Although primarily staffed by senior officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), this committee also included representatives from several other departments, such as National Defence and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). This whole-of-government innovation was a first in Canadian political affairs. The activities of the Afghanistan Task Force were reported by the Clerk of the Privy Council directly to the Prime Minister and supported a five-minister Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan. The number of Canadian civilian and police contingents deployed increased from just a few in 2006 to over one hundred by 2009. This included a relatively robust civilian leadership team at the embassy in Kabul and at Kandahar Airfield under the leadership of the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK), as well as a senior civilian director of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT).[13]

In March 2008, the Canadian Government unveiled a detailed set of six policy objectives for the mission. These were:

[…] enable the Afghan National Security Forces in Kandahar to sustain a more secure environment and promote law and order; strengthen Afghan institutional capacity to deliver basic services; provide humanitarian aid to vulnerable people; enhance border security with facilitation of Afghan Pakistani dialogue; help advance Afghanistan’s democratic governance; and facilitate Afghan-led political reconciliation […][14]

Subsequently, a framework of benchmarks was developed to report progress on each of these six key policy priorities. These measures included focused objectives for Kandahar (regional) and those connected to the entirety of Afghanistan (national). The first group of priorities focused on providing a secure environment and law and order, which was to be achieved by building the capacity of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) along with supporting efforts in justice and corrections. The second priority aimed at creating jobs, expanding education, and providing essential services such as water. The third priority involved providing humanitarian assistance to people in need. The final key area of focus was improving the management and security of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Alongside these were provincial measures that were part of two wider-ranging increments connected to the rest of the country. These national measures included encouraging Afghan institutions critical to Canada’s priorities in Kandahar and supporting democratic processes, such as elections. Ultimately, the objective was for these Canadian efforts to support Afghan-led political reconciliation efforts to weaken the insurgency and foster a sustainable peace.[15]

These six policy objectives and their corresponding measures facilitated the integration of Canadian officials into Canadian military operations. It expressed the government’s (Privy Council Office and Cabinet) interest in and coordination of a comprehensive governmental approach. This teamwork was further encouraged by the requirement to provide corresponding detailed quarterly assessments of activities to the Canadian Parliament. By the end of the combat mission, this whole-of-government process involved not only the Canadian Forces, DFAIT and CIDA, but also other government departments like the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Corrections Services Canada (CSC).[16] It is important to note, however, that despite increased harmonization amongst the efforts of all partners, strategic communications and public affairs remained inconsistent in how they were visualized and carried out by the various participants. Col (Retired) Brett Boudreau, former Director of Communications of the Afghanistan Task Force, observed that the coordination structures created by the establishment of the Task Force had a positive impact:

This forcing function to work together better, faster and in a more integrated fashion over time showed real value from a policy and communications perspective both in theatre and at respective departmental [headquarters] HQs—it is perhaps why public support for the mission and particularly for ‘the troops’, remained generally consistent even in the face of a significant number of Canadian[s] killed and wounded, as well as the considerable financial cost. By 2012 though, after a major national effort of ten years, the lack of positive results or much substantive evidence of real progress on the ground coupled with the public perception that [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] NATO (excepting the U.S., [United Kingdom] UK and Netherlands) had ‘abandoned’ Canada in the South during heavy fighting there, continues today to negatively impact Canadian public perceptions of the Afghanistan mission.[17]

One could argue that both the strength and the weakness of the Canadian mission during these years lay in its overarching focus on building Afghan capacity. As much as the international community collectively underestimated the strength of the insurgency, it overestimated the ability of Afghan leadership in governance and security efforts to assume full responsibility for responding to the challenges posed by the insurgency. Under these circumstances, Canadian activities in Kandahar revolved around balancing efforts to enable Afghan civilian authorities and security forces while at the same time neutralizing the insurgents.

The whole-of-government approach aimed to integrate all policy instruments to achieve national strategic objectives, simultaneously addressing security, governance, and economic issues. This strategy was crucial in counterinsurgency operations, where military success had to be rapidly followed by sustainable governance and development efforts. ​The panel discussion highlighted some of the challenges and successes of the Canadian intergovernmental alliance in Afghanistan, particularly in the districts of Panjwayi and Dand.

In Panjwayi, a district with a population of approximately 80,000 and strong Taliban influence, the CAF worked to provide not only security but also improvements in governance, development, and everyday life. The district leader, Haji Fazluddin Agha, played a crucial role in revitalizing the district. ​By July 2011, significant progress had been made, with an increase in open schools and clinics. In Dand, a district with a population of approximately 450,000, the CAF supported the district leader, Haji Amadullah Nazek, in building governance capacity and providing essential services. By July 2011, all schools and clinics in Dand were open, and the district was moving towards self-sufficiency.[18]

Canadian efforts to foster coordinated inter-departmental activities in Afghanistan evolved alongside the expansion of the NATO mission, national debates, and the end of the combat mission in 2011. While this panel discussion and the insights it generated are wide-ranging and hold significant value from both strategic and tactical perspectives, they also offer key lessons for future whole-of-government practices. Amongst the points discussed, the need for increased intra-government contact, understanding, and collaboration prior to such missions is critical. This need was highlighted by Lieutenant-Colonel Kimberly Unterganschnigg, who led the joint Lessons Learned cell in Task Force Kandahar (TFK) from 2010 to 2011:

Interdepartmental civilian-military cooperation was essential to address the broad scope of security, governance, reconstruction, and development activities that were under- taken by the KPRT and TFK in the final year of Canada’s involvement in Kandahar. Looking back, rather than a strategy document focused upon fixed signature projects, a more comprehensive framework and approach to the WoG mission that provided clarity on the roles and responsibilities of each of the departments, particularly with respect to activities in support of governance and development, would have improved our effectiveness, as it would have guided consistent progress over the years.[19]

Although increased coordination has been identified as an essential element of mission success in both the KPRT and Afghanistan Task Force documents, it has yet to be consistently or permanently implemented. Even in 2009, prior to the Lessons Learned exercises documented in this discussion, Canadian development specialist Andy Tamas argued the necessity of creating a “hybrid” organization consisting of “an integrated team of soldiers, development workers, diplomats and others who can protect themselves.” This organization would be funded and resourced sufficiently to deploy quickly and commence working effectively wherever required, regardless of security concerns, to produce integrated effects.[20] The ability to create, deploy, and sustain such a structure throughout the mission, supported by established strategic planning and coordination mechanisms, would enable Canada to maintain the skills and relationships so arduously gained in Afghanistan.

In 2011, while the Afghanistan Task Force was putting together its views on the Canadian whole-of-government effort, Major General Michael Flynn, a United States Army officer, argued that “the most effective organizations on today’s battlefields are those that have integrated capabilities.” He advocated that “there is little question that when you put people from multiple agencies and coalition partner nations with the right skills together, they will be more effective.”[21] The ideas of Tamas and Flynn support the conclusions of the KPRT and Afghanistan Task Force. Twenty-first-century interventions require teams of people who are familiar with one other and their respective capabilities. This suggests the need for the establishment of integrated professional development systems, increased use of inter-departmental assignments, and more streamlined civil military cooperation to enhance operating familiarity within Canadian government departments. In other words, Canada must increase its pool of deployable capabilities while developing whole-of-government organizations that contain a necessary cross-spectrum of skills and attributes that can deploy quickly wherever needed.

The moderated discussion concerning the events of 2010–2011 in Kandahar province, Afghanistan, underscores the importance of building relationships and a shared vision among governmental and non-governmental organizations to achieve effective human security outcomes. ​It highlights the interconnectedness of security, governance, and development and the importance of integrating both military and non-military efforts at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. ​The panellists’ experiences in Afghanistan demonstrated the effectiveness of the whole-of-government’s approach in addressing the complex challenges of contemporary conflicts. They highlighted the need for a comprehensive and coordinated effort to achieve lasting stability and development. One could argue that the Canadian whole-of-government approach developed in Afghanistan has broader applicability, not only for international deployments but also for domestic operations.

As the Canadian government looks toward future involvement in other fractured environments, it must heed the lessons learned from its contribution to southern Afghanistan, particularly during the final year of the combat mission. It must ensure that the observations captured by the Afghanistan Task Force, the KPRT, and the activities of TFK are properly addressed to enhance and strengthen the effectiveness of future whole-of-government activities. To achieve success in current operations, such as in Eastern Europe, and in future interventions, the lessons identified during Canada’s mission in Afghanistan must be operationalized, institutionalized and sustained. Only then will they truly become lessons learned.

Transcript of Panel Discussion, October 24, 2024

(Fort Frontenac Officers Mess, Kingston, Ontario)

Dr. Katherine Rossy:

Welcome to this event, everyone. My name is Katherine Rossy, and I am an assistant professor of history at the Royal Military College of Canada as well as Deputy Director of Research at the Queen’s Centre for International and Defence Policy […] It’s my great pleasure to be moderating this panel today. I’d like to take a moment to introduce the distinguished gentlemen on my left, starting with Dr. Howard G. Coombs, who was a special advisor to the commander of Task Force Kandahar from 2010 to 2011. Next, we have Major General (Retired) Dean Milner, who was the last warfighting Task Force commander in Kandahar and also the final Canadian commander for the NATO training mission in Afghanistan. Next to General Milner is Ambassador Tim Martin, author of Unwinnable Peace, the book we’re here to discuss today […] Ambassador Martin was the last representative of Canada in Kandahar. Next to Ambassador Martin is Major General (Retired) Ahmed Habibi, former commander of the 1st Brigade, 250th Hero Corps, Afghan National Army, where he worked […] closely with Task Force Kandahar. [… and] finally, we have Mr. Amal Mohammad-Din, who was an advisor to the Canadian Armed Forces and the senior Language and Cultural Advisor to the commander of Task Force Kandahar.

[…] Before we get started, I’d like to congratulate you, Ambassador Martin, on publishing this wonderful book, which many members of our audience will certainly enjoy reading once they pick up their autographed copy today. I found it utterly captivating and extremely accessible [… especially] for those of us who were not involved, like myself […] the book really gave me a clear sense of Canada’s role in Afghanistan. My first question is for you. What motivated you to write this book? And could you take a moment to tell us a bit more about the gentlemen sharing this panel with you today and your relationship with each of them in Afghanistan?

Ambassador Tim Martin:

Thanks very much, Dr. Rossy. Well […] I just can’t express how happy I am to be here with the Canadian military. I remember when General Natynczyk came with Minister Peter McKay, sitting down in my office, probably four or five times. We truly felt the love from Ottawa, along with the encouragement and engagement at the highest level […] I’d like to recognize that. Thank you. And thank you, Colonel Auld, for bringing us together so we can share our experiences. It’‘s great to be here with friends and comrades from Kandahar, including Howard [Coombs], Dean [Milner], General [Ahmad] Habibi, and Amal [Mohammad-Din].

Why remember Canada’s longest war? I remember being in Kandahar, and maybe you remember this too, General Natynczyk and Dean, when Prime Minister [Stephen] Harper came and said that this war is longer than the First World War and the Second World War put together. That really struck me, and it really stays with me. This is an important chapter in Canadian military history and Canadian history. Sometimes, I feel we’re turning our back on that, but I think it’s vital to remember. It’s vital to remember it, to honour the sacrifices of those who served, the ultimate sacrifice, many other sacrifices, families torn asunder, and […] there’s a psychological thing that happens when you’re exposed to extreme violence for an extended period of time. We need to recognize the sacrifice, but […] I don’t think we can dishonour that sacrifice by failing to learn from the experience. I believe that’s where the value lies of being here, with you, Howard, Dean, and General Habibi and Amal. We have a chance to reflect, answer questions, and share our experiences after ten years. […] it is the last time Canada was involved in a direct combat experience […] in the toughest part of the toughest country, Kandahar, the homeland of the Taliban. [We] brought civilians to support that […] hard work in the hardest place for a long time. I think 40,000 Canadian service personnel served in Afghanistan over that period. It’s big. So, that’s why I’m really motivated about this discussion.

I’d like to thank the RMC History Department for putting this together. You know, civilians and military don’t always see eye to eye. But one thing I was told [was to make sure] to get along with your General. That wasn’t hard for me, and I feel we’re friends now. But […] finding a way to model and project cooperation [at] the top military and civilian levels, so that it can be mirrored by conduct at other levels, is fundamental. […] General Habibi was the aptly named Hero Corps Head for the Army of Afghanistan, headquartered in Kandahar. And in a counterinsurgency fight of that nature, it’s not about Canada winning, it’s about Afghanistan.

And so, everything we did, whether it was with General Habibi and his people, or with the governor and his people, we had to think twice. What’s the best thing for me to do so [that] the Afghan partners win and we win. Howard was the counterinsurgency advisor in Task Force Kandahar. And we had open, candid talks and kicked things around. It was a safe space […] a safe space for critical knowledge, for critical analysis and critical discussions, which is important to have. I mean, you’ve got to follow orders. You’ve got to make it happen. But I think it’s important to have a safe space for critical thinking as well. And Amal, I remember so vividly that you were always with us, enabling us and advising us on how to understand Afghanistan. So, Katherine, that’s how I know these guys.

Dr. Katherine Rossy:

Thanks for sharing that with us. And with that, let’s get into the discussion. General Milner, I have a question for you […] What was the initial situation like on the ground when you commanded, and what was the state of the insurgency?

General Dean Milner:

So, I’ll kick off. It is great to have General [Walter] Natynczyk here today. Sometimes, you don’t always have that support. And having General Natynczyk here is huge because he was there four or five times with Peter MacKay. […] It was a super complex mission. And I can tell you that we had absolute support. Be it equipment, be it money, be it personnel. And so, it is great to share this day with you. I’ve been on a few missions. I’ve been to Bosnia a few times. I’ve been to Eritrea. I’ve been involved with the Middle East. And starting this mission, I had always wanted to go to Afghanistan. I think I had told my bosses from the start of the mission. I started the mission as the DPK [Directorate of Peacekeeping] policy guy, writing about why we should be going to Afghanistan. And everybody knows how much I like to write […] so I was driving us together from a policy perspective. And then I was director of army training, so I worked with guys like Spike Hazleton in the back, training the forces to go. And then shortly after that, I was the brigade commander. And I was sending battle groups to Afghanistan. And because of our structure, I wasn’t going. I was the trainer. So, you know, I’m watching all of these troops and everything that’s happening in Afghanistan, and that’s starting back in 2002. And now it’s 2010, and finally, I get the word. “Do you want to go?” Do I want to go? So, in 2010, I deploy.

This is a complex mission. This is warfighting. This is counterinsurgency. This is mixing some of the tough stuff […and] this is a complex environment. When I arrive on the ground, Canadians have been sacrificed. And we’ve kind of held the ground in Kandahar. But there was a realization that to fight the counterinsurgency, we didn’t have enough troops. That whole ratio of troops to people on the ground. So […] we’d been holding our own, and we really never knew exactly how many Taliban were out there. We could guess. We talked about it, General Habibi, and I, and Tim, and Howie: 15,000. So, we arrived on the ground with a still fairly significant Taliban threat. They were in the villages. There was shadow governance. They were everywhere. But the good Americans […] they really started in 2009 and 2010 with [President Barack] Obama. They brought in 90,000 extra troops, which enabled us as a Canadian contingent to cut. We used to have all of Kandahar. So, we were now able to focus on three provinces or three districts within Kandahar. So, I had Daman, I had Panjwayi, and I had Dand, and a lot of that with General Habibi.

[…] There was an absolute Taliban threat. They had taken over the Horn of Panjwayi. There’s a lot of places we didn’t even operate yet, because the Taliban were there. So again, significant threat. But I now had an excellent ratio to the first long war fight. I mean, that [was] my focus, to fight the Taliban. And that we did. Everything from soft fighting to air assaults to a lot of great intelligence to find out where they were. And everything was teamed up with General Habibi because we knew we were not going to go. So, I worked with General Habibi. Wherever we went, we went together. We soldiered together. We patrolled together.  

So, [with] still a significant threat of Taliban on the ground, and a realization that we now had the troops, we could start to conduct […] to develop a village approach, so that we could move into each of the villages. And I had U.S. soldiers on the command […] we were working for a division, U.S. 10th Mountain Division. A great guy named General James Terry […] gave us Canadians—I had a calf squatter, which was outstanding. They ran Dand for me. I had initially the 1 RCR battle group. And I had Van Doos. They always liked to practice my French. Ça c’est la raison pour lequel je suis complètement bilingue. So, it was still a very challenging timeframe. But I think we started to see that we could handle the situation. And then we had a great whole-of-government team, which I’ll talk about a little bit later.

Dr. Katherine Rossy:

Perhaps we can pivot to the relationship between the Canadian Armed Forces and the Afghan National Army. This is a question for you all […] but particularly […] for General Habibi. What was the state of the Afghan Army in 2010, particularly your brigade? And how did priorities [such as] governance, security, and development shape your interactions with the Canadian Task Force, and Canada’s whole-of-government team?

General Dean Milner:

By the way, General Habibi spoke no English when we first met [...] He now understands everything, but he’s got Amal to translate for him. But he’s very capable.

General Ahmad Habibi (Translated by Mr. Amal Mohammad-Din):

First of all, I’m very happy, sirs, to be among you, and it is a great honour and privilege to see my good old friends […]  

Before I come to your question, ma’am, I’d like to say a few words and then come to your answer. First of all, I’d like to congratulate Mr. Martin on writing such an incredible book. And I also would like to mention that Mr. Martin was actually there on the ground […] he [wrote] it from the ground and witnessed everything.

 Sir, you have worked with so many different nations, the Germans, the Turks, the French […] with Canadians and with our American friends […] To come to your question, ma’am, I’d like to start by saying that I’ve actually worked with so many different nations, and I was honoured to be working with our Canadian friends starting from 2006. I started working with different battle groups and there was a deployment of six months so I saw many different battle groups coming and going and it was interesting for me to see the involvement of the entire operation […].

[…] I was fortunate to work with [General Grant and General Laroche] once they took over the command from our American friends, I was there to witness it and started to do operations together. Fortunately, in the past five years when the command was taking over, I witnessed amazing leadership in Canadian forces and saw lots of accomplishment and achievements right in front of me. The leadership from Ottawa paid many visits to support the morale of the Canadian forces. General Natynczyk has come to Kandahar over five times not only to support [Canadian] troops but also the Afghan troops.

As General Milner mentioned earlier, initially the presence of the enemy and major groups in Kandahar was really big. They belonged to major terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and different dangerous groups. The number of enemy and the way enemy was [meant] it was not an easy ground for the Canadian forces to get into. I also had the honour to work with Colonel Ian Hope. He was the first battle group commander, and we started to conduct a lot of operations in fighting [the] enemy in the area. And Umar Lavai was the second battle group commander that I had the honour to work with. Also […] I was fortunate to be part of major operations in [Operation] Medusa […] And Colonel Keith […] was the 2IC for the task force. And we conducted many operations in Jiri province.

When Canadian forces came, they started to work in three different sectors. One was mentorship. That was our first taskforce […] The mentorship actually helped my corps, 205th Corps, in training and mentoring. The Canadian Forces worked with the United States. They were not only great mentors, but they also took over in training us all, from J-1 to J-5, being EOD, logistics, or any other things. Initially the way we started to work alongside our Canadian Forces [was in health and evacuations]. They used to plan operations, and with their help, they would lead, or we would lead side-by-side, and that’s how we conducted operations. This is a time when we were in such a situation that we had to create our own plans in the United States, in NATO. And our personnel realized that this was a joint plan. We saw that they were capable of doing better operations and further development of their operations. The Afghan National Army was at the embryonic stage at the time, and we were not capable of planning and executing. The accomplishment later on became that the Afghan National Army was capable of planning and executing operations on their own or working together with the Canadian forces. I testify today that after the Canadian forces left Kandahar, 205th Corps, my corps, was able to plan and execute operations. [We also] had the capability to monitor and run our headquarters.

So, the Afghan National Army overall was capable of following the footprint at the international level. And we would like to thank our Canadian friends for [allowing us to] follow [in] their footsteps, exactly the way we engaged with our key leaders in the villages, [be it] patrols or missions […] we used to do it together. We conducted many operations after our Canadian friends left. We wanted to make sure that we paved the road for development and economic growth there. So, we conducted several operations from different areas. That being said, it was incredible that after the tactical operations were conducted, we also had amazing support from our KPRT that enabled us to continue development work in the region.

It’s definitely worth mentioning that […] the Afghan people do remember the amazing development work that started Dahla Dam, which was a major project. We worked on clinics, we worked on roads, lots of growth took place. I’d like to acknowledge that that was [because] of the support of our Canadian friends. We were able to pave and build many roads and clinics, which was again [due to] the support of the Canadian government.

The two provinces that were mentioned earlier, the two districts, Panjwayi and Dand, had [much] enemy presence, due to which we were not able to continue our development work or build roads. General Vance and I both planned to see how we [could] execute operations to clear this area so that we [could] continue the development work. The team sitting here in front of you was the team that worked together, made things possible, and it was a great success. The way I look at it from my perspective, there were many achievements.

Dr. Katherine Rossy:

Thank you very much, General Habibi, for painting such a vivid picture and sharing your insights with us […] So as I understand it, there you all were facing unprecedented challenges, leaning across multiple chains of command in a whole-of-government campaign. How did you manage to bolt together civilian and military capabilities in such a complex conflict?

Ambassador Tim Martin:

Well, I think bolt is a good verb. The classic form of articulating military with diplomatic and political [objectives] is having an attaché in the embassy, but it’s not robust. That’s good for policy control and communication. But it’s not enough, especially if you’re in a country like Afghanistan. We see other places like this, such as Sudan and Palestine, where the national government has no connective tissue down to where the people are. So that means you have to work at every level, including the district level […] The answer is that Canada had the Kandahar provincial reconstruction team, and with it, a relationship between the civilians and the military.

I think as you are studying this topic and thinking: “What am I going to do when I’m the planner here?” you need to think about civilians as a force multiplier. A lot of people might not like that terminology because [it is] important to respect mandates but think of civilians as integral. The counterinsurgency mantra is clear, bold, build. That’s like a spectrum from military to civilian, and if you’re a commander out there then you want that build to be coming down the road on time to follow the work you’re doing […] There was some stumbling in the campaign, obviously, that resulted in strategic dilemmas that were extremely important and highly politicized. But what we have is a civilian capability for building schools, financing the government, irrigation, economic reconstruction, humanitarian work, like vaccinating against polio, political reconstruction. But what does political reconstruction mean? It means building courthouses, it means building safe housing for government workers facing an assassination campaign. It means developing provincial legislatures. We had police training that was mentioned, the RCMP. But one of the most interesting ones was prison reform. Prisons were black holes for human rights in countries like Afghanistan and we faced some political issues about that. But Corrections Services Canada came, went into the prisons, and we monitored the detainees and that was the civilian function.

I think it was very healthy to have the separation of duties between civilians and the military on the detainees. And then there was extending governance. What does that mean? That sounds so abstract. Well, it meant moving from discussions at the level of the governor and the governor’s palace in Kandahar City to getting out to Panjwayi so [that] the elders and others could see that benefits were coming to them. The model we had was with Dean and General Habibi, we’d go together to Panjwayi, to Dand, with our teams, and the elders would be assembled and say this is their problem and this is what we need and then we’d build a response. Whether it was police, whether it was a school, you know, different things. […] Canada demonstrated one of the best capacities for holding together civilian and military capabilities. It was fundamental and we’ll need it again.

General Dean Milner:

[…] You know, I realize that when somebody asked me the question, “How much time did you put […] what were your efforts for warfighting compared to your support for the whole-of-government team, the governance and the development side?” That was a tough question because I knew that my focus, my priority, was security. But I had the capability, so I had a very strong task force. And again […] I worked alongside General Habibi and again that was a significant focus. But I could not win on the ground unless I teamed up with Tim. We sat down, we didn’t get a chance to initially train together and that was a little bit of a problem with the training. But Tim had been with us in Wainwright, or I can’t remember where else it was, but we had missed [one another] because I was in a different place at the time. But we sat down and developed an extremely close relationship. And I understood that my focus also needed to be with those other critical capabilities. [We studied] fighter counterinsurgency, [and] based on history, the Brits were outstanding in Malaya, now Malaysia. [Also] the challenges that we’d seen with counterinsurgency fighting with Vietnam and all the mistakes that had been there.

So, there were lessons out there, but one hundred percent, I’d say, well, not one hundred, but fifty percent plus of my time during that year was focused on supporting Tim on the governance side. We supported district governors because they were the leaders. We supported the development in each of the different districts because we really wanted to support the population. We didn’t want the population moving to the Taliban.  So, all of those critical aspects of that, ensure the clear, hold build [of counterinsurgency], clear the Taliban out, hold the ground, understand the dynamics of the political environment that we were working with. And then help them develop the simple things, building schools, building infrastructure, building roads. All of that was done very closely with the team, General Habibi, and Tim Martin.

So, Tim was the lead. Tim was still the lead for the entire province. There wasn’t a day that there wasn’t either some kind of conversation or a focus on those other critical parts, the development and the governance. And I spent a lot of time, and they’ll know that, with district governors that I still talk about today. Nazak from Dand province. Haji Manan. God, he grabbed my hand once and we’re walking through, and the photos went everywhere. They took photos. But we spent a lot of time together. Fazli Agha had just had his son killed by the Taliban […] there wasn’t a day that didn’t go by that we spent time focused on those other critical elements on top of that war fight.

Ambassador Tim Martin:

Can I make a comment in hot pursuit?

General Dean Milner:

Yes.

Ambassador Tim Martin:

This was a unique organization, the KPRT, and it was enabled by the specific military units. Of course, transportation, the stabilization company, we couldn’t go anywhere if we weren’t with the squadron and the vehicles. And also the engineering team. The engineering team was critical to building that stuff in a hot combat kind of situation. So, there was a hybrid organization. It really worked great.

Dr. Howard Coombs:

I would say, as you can probably tell from the back and forth, that relationships are key. But all of us who have had relationships and marriages that have gone on for a very long time, in most cases, realize that [there are] ups and downs […] And although we’re sometimes presenting a very glossy face on it, it was not without disagreement. And I think, honestly, if you buy the book, you’ll see that Tim accurately portrays some of the nuances of the relationship between the civilians and the military. One could not exist without the other in that environment. But I will say [that] the difficulty became at times the tension between culture—us, the military, because I was on the military side of the house, co-opting the civilian side of the house to achieve counterinsurgency objectives. An agreement had to come between two leaders about how we could align those objectives, still attain what we needed to achieve on both sides of the house and maintain our impartiality within our respective spheres. As General Milner said, defence and development go hand-in-hand. Governance, defence, it all had to fit together. They were a triad, and they all had to be kept in balance.

[…] We said relationships are key, vision is key. And those things came through in spades. But the things that you’re wrestling with here are the nuances of it. What does that really mean? How do you do a military plan and incorporate civilians and your advice into that military plan? How do they get access to the secure materials that you’re using, or do they get access, as you plan and create plans? We had quite a large number of Japanese in headquarters. I don’t really know how that happened. But we had Roger Cotton as our J-5, and he did an outstanding job of contacting and integrating civilian input into the plan. The people who were in the military, the people who were there for the first time, as well as the ops folks for the daily ops. That advice is necessary and has to be incorporated, and there has to be, at least if not always, as much transparency as possible. If you can’t share information, you explain [that] you can’t share information. You just don’t buy this. And I think in doing that, you’re able to establish trust amongst each other. And I will say that I had a privileged position because I got to be the unknown Canadian civilian for a long time. I’m the guy in the back and then the corner photos, but I’ll say that not everything they did they agreed on, but they always came to consensus, and that was incredibly important and actually quite entertaining to watch at the time.

Dr. Katherine Rossy:

I’m wondering, looking at today’s geopolitical landscape, if there any lessons that can be brought forward into the planning of complex peace operations?

General Dean Milner: 

Well, I mean, there’s tremendous lessons that we learned from Afghanistan, and I would argue going forward, you look at what’s happening in Ukraine, you look at what happened, what’s happening in Gaza. There’s no doubt in my mind that there will be more counterinsurgency-focused fights […] We will experience more counterinsurgency [and] you need to be a hundred percent focused on warfighting but that we absolutely learned, and this needs to continue to be learned, that you’re going to fight with those three focuses. The security, the development, and the governance. And you’ve got to incorporate it into your training. You’ve got to incorporate it into wherever you’re going to go into Wainwright or that early on training.

[…] We didn’t have a counterinsurgency doctor when we started. We begged, borrowed, and stole. We were part of writing that. So those are the kind of lessons we learned. We developed seminars with the whole-of-government team in foreign affairs, where we specifically talked about what we were going to encounter. So, we need to remember that that team needs to start early on. We need to be completely integrated from the start. So, yeah, there’s many lessons I think that need to continue. And Tim has talked about those in his book.

Ambassador Tim Martin:

I’d like to pick up on that with three strategic dilemmas that I discussed in the book. One is corrupt leadership in the host country of Afghanistan. We depended on it. We didn’t hold auditions for our preferred leaders in Afghanistan. And some of them were very corrupt. An example of that, involved Ahmed Wali Karzai, the brother of President Hamid Karzai. There was a leak of an embassy report from the embassy in Kabul to the State Department referencing a meeting that my predecessor Ben Roswell was in. And right on top of the report, it said [that] AWK is widely known to be vastly corrupt and a narcotics dealer. However, we must deal with him because he’s head of the Provincial Council. So, what do you do with that? We never cracked that problem. And one of the political consequences is when Afghans saw us shaking hands and working on projects, they wondered, well, this isn’t really the government I want. So that’s a dilemma.

Detainees is a dilemma, but we developed a Canadian umbrella and would go in and check on our detainees. After a political controversy and crisis, there was a practical, regular monitoring that ensured human rights were respected for our detainees. And interestingly enough, when I was leaving and I asked Kandaharians, “What would you remember about Canada?” they said: “We remember that you sent your people into the prisons to check on detainees.” Everybody had a cousin or brother-in-law or somebody who went through the prison system, it seemed. And Canadians respected the dignity of the adversary. But that respect for the dignity of the adversary is one of the things that they said they would always remember.

And then I think gender is something. I didn’t realize this until I wrote my book, but we only had one female Afghan interpreter, Mariam Sahar. She was hired when she was fifteen years old. And you think that’s fifty percent of the population? That’s a capability that we know will be necessary. So, thinking about gender, that fifty percent of the population and how we reach them when they’re so often alienated or culturally isolated from military and security work.

Dr. Katherine Rossy:

I think that we can maybe end this panel by attempting to answer your main question, Ambassador Martin. How should we remember Canada’s Kandahar mission? Was this truly an “unwinnable peace”? I’d like to hear from all of you, if possible, to see what you think.  

General Dean Milner:

I’ll jump in real quick. I didn’t like the title. And I told Tim […] nothing’s unwinnable. But, you know, it was a complex fight. And what we don’t talk about is all the influences other than Afghanistan. Pakistan was a massive thorn, and Pakistan’s arguably worse off than it was so there was that side of the house. There was Iran on the other flank […] I didn’t even realize, but Iran had developed a general officer that was in the ranks of the Afghan army. And they had brought him along. And he was constantly providing information to Iran. You had the ‘stans’ to the north. You had the Russian influence. You had India […] coming in from the flank.

The leadership of Afghanistan, and General Habibi and I talked about this […] I was [ticked] off when the Afghan army essentially folded under the Taliban. And why was that? Well, the leadership of Afghanistan was not strong. They’d gone through Karzai and then they now had Ghani. There was the corruption. There were the leadership challenges. The best were not being put in positions to lead the Afghan troops. Some of the leaders that bypassed great generals like General Habibi were in charge of the Afghan army, which really didn’t instill that morale and capability. So, there were so many different circumstances.

[…] Canadians left too early, in my mind. We left too early. We were in Kandahar. We had to leave our post and give it to the Americans. But we picked a good post. We became trainers, so we were trainers for three years. We started to build the institutions with the government. And I was back there a second time for another year. We got them up to maybe fifty, fifty-five percent. We didn’t get them all the way there. General Habibi will tell you, he thinks the Afghan army was in maybe about eighty percent. So how long do you stay? I don’t know. But Tim knows. I think it’s a great title now [Unwinnable Peace: Untold Stories of Canada’s Mission in Afghanistan] because when I reflect on it, it’s a conflicting one because we wanted to win there, and we did. Canadians did some outstanding work. We fought hard. We killed Taliban. We built roads. We built schools. We made things safe for women. We accomplished a lot there. But when we left, that was hard on a lot of us. So that title, I still had that belief that it was winnable. Things take generations sometimes. And we came out of Afghanistan. And what did we do when we came out of Afghanistan? Our army didn’t do much for quite a while, as a matter of fact. So, could we have stayed longer as an army? I believe yes. But anyway, it’s a great book to read. But again, you can see all the challenges of why it maybe wasn’t completely winnable.

Dr. Howard Coombs

I will say [the] most fragile part of our operations was the link between the very positive, as General Miller said, tactical effects that we achieved across all the areas of triad development, governance and military aspects. But we never were able to connect those effects to a centralized government in a way that Afghans agreed. They saw themselves at the district level, somewhat at the provincial level, but at times just the idea of that centralized government and the connection with what was happening on the ground in Kandahar and those effects being connected to the central government never really did occur. And I do think Tim, you portray that well. So, I would say at the tactical level we had great success. But at the end of the day, we couldn’t connect that success to strategic effect.

General Ahmad Habibi

I do agree with Ambassador Martin, General Dean Milner, and Dr. Coombs that we did actually have a lot of accomplishments. I must mention that the operations, the tactical portion of it, the development and the relationship with the people of Kandahar is also something that we have to take into consideration. Besides looking at your book, sir, we do understand that we should keep in mind that until today, the people of Kandahar, when I speak to them, ask me “How is General Dean Milner doing?” or “How is Mr. Tim Martin doing?” That’s an indication that the footprint, the accomplishment, the peace, the kids going to school, the plans, all the development needs to be taken into consideration. That was hard work.

To the young officers, I could mention today that one of the failures or the negative points in the Afghan National Army was that we had negative influence from our political leaders […] the Afghan National Army was not able to select the right people for the right job.

Ambassador Martin

I want to mention two things. One is that maybe we missed an opportunity to pivot towards peace when Canada and the U.S. were at the height of our power. There was a demobilisation program going. The money wasn’t getting there but the political willingness was there, and we missed it. It wasn’t until the [Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program], I can’t remember when that was. Two words are not in that agreement: human rights and women, and we can see the consequences of that. I’ll just put that there as a diplomatic limbo.

How should we remember it? It was our longest war. We need to remember it carefully, accurately, with feeling for the sacrifice. We need to remember it for what we did, to know what we did, and I think we need to look at what we did, in the moment, in the hardest place, the hardest challenges, and that we did it maintaining and reflecting the values of Canadians. I think that’s very important, too, because when a military gets offside with the values of its nation, it just doesn’t work. So, we maintained our values, we took the fight to the hardest place, we proved our combat ability to our allies, and we met our treaty obligations. The last line in my book is: “In the darkest places, it’s where Canadian values shine brightest.” Canadian valour and values. That’s the way I feel about it.

Dr. Katherine Rossy

Before I open the floor to questions, I would just like to read something that Canadian journalist and broadcaster Hannah Thibedeau said about Ambassador Martin’s book, if that’s alright. She said, “Tim Martin’s groundbreaking work goes beyond the headlines, uncovering the untold stories behind the conflict. With first-hand accounts from diplomats, aid workers, and Afghan interpreters, Martin unravels the intricacies of the mission, offering readers a nuanced understanding of the realities on the ground. His storytelling serves as a testament to the enduring dedication of those who pursued a safe and stable Afghanistan, achieving victories in some battles, yet ultimately unable to secure a lasting peace.” You have the last word, Ambassador.

Ambassador Tim Martin

Thanks a lot. I wrote two books, one when I first came back from Afghanistan. I was angry, and I think I felt some of this. You know, it was tough, and it was very emotional as well, and some of these dilemmas like this warlord dilemma really bothered me. So, I wrote a novel about that. It’s set in Somalia and involves a conflict between a Canadian human rights lawyer, a corrupt Italian general, and a cunning warlord. So, I did that, and then that got recognized, and I was asked to write a book about Afghanistan because Canadians don’t have an accessible, interesting, fast-paced book about it. So that’s why my publisher contacted me. And I’d like to say something else. You don’t write a book because you know something, you write a book because you want to understand something. I was driven to understand it for my own self and driven to engage with the twenty-five people I interviewed […] To do that after ten years, after dedicating one or more years of your life in a very passionate way for something you really care about, and thinking about it after ten years, I think it led to a good result. It helped me come to peace and understand what we did and what it means.