*This article also appears as a chapter in the 2024 KCIS Conference volume that was published in Sept. 2025

Introduction

Terrorism has once again become a significant concern for European governments. While European countries are far less affected by terrorism compared to countries in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia—with no European country ranking in the top 25 of most affected nations[1]—terrorism remains a major public policy issue, especially considering a recent series of deadly attacks in different European countries. These include the October 2023 shooting of three Swedes in Brussels, an August 2024 knife attack in the German town of Solingen that killed three people, and a February 2025 car attack at a union demonstration in Munich, which injured over thirty individuals. All of these attacks are believed to have been carried out by foreign nationals and motivated by Islamic extremism or jihadism, with perpetrators originating from countries such as Afghanistan, Tunisia, and Syria. While terrorism is multipolar and deadly attacks can stem from various forms of violent extremism, much of the focus in Europe remains on Islamic extremism and jihadism. Public and policy debates often seek to link jihadist terrorism to multiculturalism and migration.[2]

This connection is particularly evident in the recent rise of citizenship revocation as a response to terrorism. Over a decade ago, as European citizens travelled to Iraq and Syria to join the Islamic State, European liberal democracies began utilizing existing or newly established legal frameworks to revoke the citizenship of dual nationals suspected of jihadist involvement.[3] Committing a terrorist offence or joining a terrorist organization abroad is seen as the ultimate betrayal of loyalty to the nation-state and thus turning dual-citizen ‘terrorists’ from citizens into non-citizens is deemed the appropriate response. The consequences of this trend are now becoming clearer. In the UK, for example, the number of citizenship deprivations surpassed 200 between 2010 and 2023,[4] and other European countries are seeing similarly significant increases in citizenship revocations tied to terrorism. In the Netherlands, for instance, where the government aims to revoke the Dutch citizenship of all dual nationals convicted of a terrorist offense or who have joined a terrorist organization abroad, 58 dual nationals had their citizenship revoked by June 2024.[5]

Most of the terrorist offenders who lose their Dutch citizenship cannot be removed to the country of their remaining nationality because they are not recognized as citizens or are not safe there. My research reveals that individuals with Moroccan nationality as their remaining nationality are overrepresented in this group. Most of them lack and cannot obtain the necessary travel documents. Upon completion of their prison sentences, most of these former citizens become ‘undesirable but unremovable’ individuals, left in legal limbo[6] while continuing to reside unlawfully in the Netherlands.

In light of the 2024 KCIS conference’s theme being War and Human Security in an Evolving World, this chapter examines the legal limbo faced by individuals after citizenship revocation from a human security perspective. It presents findings from an ongoing study, which includes interviews with a variety of Dutch stakeholders including municipalities, the Probation Service, the National Police, the Public Prosecution Service, immigration authorities, social and health care organizations, and other organizations working with terrorist offenders who have completed their sentences.[7] The aim is to understand the diverse ways in which citizenship revocation affects the human security aspects of the Dutch counterterrorism strategy. The chapter begins by conceptualizing human security and looking at some previous work on its connection to terrorism. It then explores the Dutch case by first explaining the context, followed by an analysis of the goals and practice of citizenship revocation for terrorism from a human security perspective. It concludes by noting that this practice is deeply problematic from a human security viewpoint and may, in fact, be counterproductive to enhancing national security.

Human Security and Counterterrorism

For the purposes of exploring ‘human security,’ I draw on a 2012 UN General Assembly resolution, which noted that the notion of human security is commonly understood to cover three principles: first, that ‘[a]ll individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential;’ second, that ‘[h]uman security calls for people-centered, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities;’ and third, that ‘human security recognizes the interlinkages between peace, development and human rights, and equally considers civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.’[8] Terrorism and violent extremism are diametrically opposed to these principles: violent extremist ideologies are by definition at odds with freedom from fear, equal opportunities for all individuals and empowerment of all communities, and the peaceful exercise of civil, political, economic and social rights. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that responses to terrorism and violent extremism, policies that aim to increase ‘national security,’ are often weighed against the exercise of human rights by (potential) terrorists.

Scheinin notes, however, that the metaphor of ‘balancing’ between security and human rights is false. Instead, he urges governments to analyze under what conditions restrictions of human rights for the (legitimate) aim of increasing security would be permissible—by asking whether the measure that restricts human rights actually increases security, whether the benefit of the measure is proportional to the restriction of rights, or whether an equal benefit cannot be reached with a measure that has less of an impact on human rights.[9] According to Scheinin, ‘[t]here are ways of improving security that avoid or at least minimize any restrictions upon human rights. They are to be preferred over the blunt approach of seeing “balancing” as a choice of the security of many being a higher value than the rights of few.’[10] In responding to terrorism, states should not ‘replicate the same moral wrong’ that terrorism implies.[11]

Citizenship revocation affects human security because, as Jaghai and Van Waas note, the State has a significant role in protecting and fulfilling human rights: ‘Deprivation of nationality breaks the citizen-State bond, making it more difficult for people who are no (longer) citizens to enjoy the protection of their, or any, state and creating a context in which human security and human dignity are threatened.’[12] To illustrate the far-reaching consequences of denationalization, the authors refer to a frequently cited quote from a decision by the Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court from 1958, who ‘famously described deprivation of nationality as losing “the right to have rights.’[13] Indeed, such a loss of rights is clear if non-citizens, after being deprived of their citizenship, cannot claim the protection of another state—which is true particularly for former citizens who become stateless or de facto stateless if they find themselves in a state of legal limbo. Jaghai and Van Waas also point out that the practice of citizenship revocation is inherently unequal and selective, as in many states it only targets citizens who acquired nationality through naturalization, and/or dual citizens, particularly those with a nationality of a country that does not allow for renunciation. Especially worrying from a human security perspective, they argue, ‘is the manner in which the restricted applicability of nationality deprivation as a [counterterrorism] measure engenders not only inequality, but “othering” that can damage social cohesion.’[14]

Revocation of Dutch Citizenship and its Immigration Law Consequences

To provide context, it is important to briefly explain how the revocation of Dutch citizenship in relation to (alleged) involvement in terrorism is carried out. In practice, the revocation is based on one of two grounds: (i) a final conviction for a terrorist offense (Article 14(2)(b) Nationality Act), or (ii) the determination that the individual has joined a terrorist organization abroad (Article 14(4) Nationality Act). For the purposes of this discussion, which focuses on the tensions between criminal justice, counterterrorism, and citizenship revocation, only the first ground will be considered. In accordance with international law and the Nationality Act, the revocation of Dutch citizenship must not result in statelessness and can only occur if an individual holds two or more nationalities (Article 14(8) Nationality Act).

The Minister of Justice and Security has delegated the authority to revoke citizenship to the Secretary of State, who manages the process. The Minister retains discretionary powers to refrain from revocation. The Immigration and Naturalisation Service advises the Minister and oversees the process leading to revocation and any immigration-related consequences. Once Dutch citizenship is revoked, the individual is considered a foreign national under the Dutch Aliens Act. An assessment is then made to determine whether the individual is eligible for a residence permit. If no grounds exist for granting a permit, or if the individual is deemed a threat to public order or national security, they are required to leave the Netherlands.

If the individual fails to leave the Netherlands within the prescribed period and lacks legal residence status, the Dutch government will seek to deport them under the authority of the Repatriation and Departure Service. Ideally, a person whose citizenship has been revoked and whose residence status has been refused will be deported directly after serving any criminal sentence. If deportation is not possible, the Aliens Act allows for the imposition of measures such as a reporting requirement or a geographical restriction. Under the Temporary Act on Administrative Measures for Counterterrorism, the Minister of Justice and Security, in consultation with the mayor of the municipality where the individual resides, may impose similar measures if the person is considered an immediate threat to national security.

Objectives of Citizenship Revocation and Criminal Justice in Light of Human Security

As a first step in this analysis, it is helpful to take a closer look at the rationale behind governmental practices of citizenship revocation on the one hand and criminal justice and counter-terrorism on the other hand. What are the intended goals of citizenship revocation for terrorism, compared to those of addressing terrorism through the criminal justice system as part of broader counter-terrorism efforts? And how do these objectives align with a human security perspective?

Objectives of Citizenship Revocation for Terrorism in the Netherlands

A ruling of the highest administrative court from 2020 provides insight into how the Dutch legislator and the Court view the goals of citizenship revocation following a criminal conviction for terrorism. The Court considered that the revocation of citizenship in this context ‘must be regarded as an administrative order measure and not as a punitive sanction.’ The measure is also not seen as a counter-terrorism measure: ‘The primary purpose of the measure is not to combat jihadism and enhance state security. The [government] rightly points out that the withdrawal of Dutch nationality expresses that [the appellant] has turned against the interests of the Netherlands in such a degree that the bond with the Netherlands can no longer exist.’[15]

As discussed in the introduction, terrorism is seen as an ultimate betrayal of loyalty to the nation-state. While the Dutch government and the highest court emphasize that citizenship revocation is not intended as a punishment, interviews with organizations working with affected individuals suggest that the measure is experienced as punitive due to its far-reaching consequences. Tripkovic argues that although conceptual differences exist between punishment and citizenship revocation, the latter’s effects are closer to those of punishment than any other state-imposed sanction. In the absence of a clearer framework or understanding of the measure, revocation can only be interpreted within a punitive context. Furthermore, citizenship revocation has a punitive character because it involves a disapproval of the moral behavior of citizens.[16]

The qualification of the withdrawal of Dutch nationality as an administrative ‘order measure’ is remarkable. After withdrawal, a residence permit can (and in most cases, will) be denied, based on an assumed threat to national security. While it seems a logical thought that a measure aimed at preserving or promoting order arises from a potential threat to order in the present or future, the determination that someone poses a threat to national security can follow automatically from the conviction.[17] There is no requirement to assess whether the person poses a threat at the time of citizenship revocation. In absence of such an assessment of a current or future threat, the immigration law consequences triggered by the withdrawal still appear to serve a punitive purpose.

In conclusion, according to the Dutch government and the highest administrative court, the purpose of citizenship revocation following a criminal conviction is not punitive, nor is it (in the first place) to combat jihadism and increase state security. Rather, the withdrawal serves to express that the figurative bond with the Netherlands ‘can no longer exist.’ The fact, however, that this bond can continue to exist between the State and a mono-national Dutch citizen who has also seriously violated the essential interests of the Dutch State, but who cannot lose citizenship, suggests that the State chooses not to repair this bond rather than being incapable of doing so. This selective approach runs counter to the principle of human security, which asserts that all individuals should have ‘[…] an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential.’[18]

Objectives of Counter-terrorism and Resocialization of Terrorist Offenders in the Netherlands

The Netherlands has developed a National Counterterrorism Strategy for 2022–2026, with the overarching aim of preventing terrorist attacks. This strategy is built around four main objectives: procurement, prevention, preparation, and prosecution. A policy document on the strategy clarifies the government’s goals, including enhancing the information-sharing capacity between security and other actors at the national level—for instance for the purpose of identifying individuals who pose a (potential) threat to national security. Prevention relies, inter alia, on ‘targeted prevention through interventions on individuals or groups that are displaying concrete signs of radicalization towards terrorism or violent extremism or on individuals that could be directly influenced by networks or individuals of this nature.’ [19]

Under the prosecution objective, the government seeks to ‘enforce national and international legal order; ensure safe reintegration during and after detention; and use administrative measures and measures under immigration law.’[20] For the latter, the assumption is that after imposing administrative measures—most importantly citizenship revocation—the individuals will leave the Netherlands. However, as noted above, in many cases removal or return of the individual is not possible. The policy document notes that in such cases ‘supervisory measures may be imposed under immigration law’ in order to ‘achieve the better monitoring of individuals like this who are not lawfully residents of the Netherlands.’ When it comes to safe reintegration after detention, to reduce risks that accompany the return to society of individuals, the policy document notes that ‘the Custodial Institutions Agency works with the Dutch Probation Service and the municipalities to achieve controlled reintegration.’[21]

What does this look like in practice? Convicted terrorist offenders are often part of a multidisciplinary ‘case monitoring’ process. During detention, efforts related to resocialization are discussed in the Multidisciplinary Coordination Meeting on Resocialization (MAR), which involves collaboration between the Custodial Institutions Agency and municipalities, which are responsible for post-detention care. If the court has imposed specific conditions, the Probation Service monitors compliance and is also involved in MAR discussions. At the municipal level, the case monitoring is typically part of an ‘individual-oriented approach’ (persoonsgerichte aanpak) aimed at preventing radicalization and extremism,[22] which, according to Van der Woude et al., is one of the key pillars of the local counter-terrorism approach.[23] The individual-oriented approach focuses on preventing radicalization and supporting deradicalization efforts. The municipality, as the coordinating body, along with the police and the Public Prosecution Service (OM), form the core partners within the individual-oriented approach. Additionally, case partners, such as the Dutch Probation Service, and external case partners, such as the Immigration Service, may also be involved. In addition, the mayor, together with the local government, is responsible for maintaining public order and safety and has specific duties related to national security.

In summary, prosecution plays a central role in the Dutch National Counterterrorism Strategy. The Custodial Institutions Agency, municipalities, and the Probation Service are key players in preventing radicalization, as they provide post-detention support and ensure the safe reintegration of former detainees. This approach aligns well with the principle that human security requires ‘people-centered, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities.’[24] In this approach, arguably, national security and human security do not clash, but go hand in hand.

How Citizenship Deprivation Frustrates a Human Security Approach to Counter-terrorism

When examining the objectives of citizenship revocation on the one hand and criminal justice within the broader counter-terrorism strategy on the other, a potential conflict emerges. Addressing terrorism within the criminal justice system focuses on the safe reintegration of offenders after detention, emphasizing a prevention-oriented, individualized approach. In contrast, for dual citizens, citizenship revocation seeks to permanently sever the bond between the offender and society. My research into citizenship revocation following a terrorism conviction in the Dutch case study highlights its impact on various dimensions of human security. Two key points are noteworthy here: first, how the administrative measure of citizenship revocation interferes with or undermines the criminal justice process, which is grounded in human security principles; and second, how citizenship revocation excludes expatriated terrorism offenders from counter-terrorism efforts and may, in fact, be counterproductive to those efforts.

Undermining the Criminal Justice Process

In a remarkable set of five judgments, a first instance criminal court in the Netherlands seemed to suggest that it invoked the possibility that the suspects on trial might in the future lose their Dutch citizenship in its determination of a suitable penalty. The court reasoned: ‘(t)he suspect was born and raised in the Netherlands and, after she has served her sentence, has been punished. From that perspective, it is reasonable that the suspect, who has expressed remorse and will have to undergo her punishment, should be able to participate in society afterwards and with the help of special conditions as advised by the Probation Service.’[25] Often in terrorism cases, Dutch criminal courts impose a custodial sentence in combination with a suspended sentence, connected to conditions overseen by the Probation Service. For instance, a requirement that the convict must participate in certain interventions, like a behavioral training, may be one such condition.

The Public Prosecutor appealed these decisions, reasoning that possible consequences of citizenship revocation should not be part of the deliberations regarding punishment in a criminal court.[26] The fact that it was raised by the criminal court raises the question of where the boundaries of criminal law lie in this context. If a criminal judge imposes a lower sentence in anticipation of a possible future imposition of an administrative measure, arguably the criminal judge is overstepping its role. On the other hand, it could also be argued that through revoking citizenship, the Dutch government is effectively undermining the judgment of the criminal judge and the authority of the criminal justice process. The judge, after weighing everything, imposes a sentence with conditions aimed at a safe reintegration into society. Tripkovic already noted that a government that revokes citizenship while a sentence is being executed ‘[…] absolves itself of the responsibility to provide appropriate penal treatment in the phase of execution: its involvement terminates as soon as the citizen is renounced (either through formal revocation or by denying repatriation). Former citizens are consequently frequently caught up in a penal vacuum, outside formal penal control and cannot hold any state accountable for whichever (quasi) penal treatment they are exposed to.’[27]

Interference With Local Counter-terrorism Efforts

Individuals whose Dutch citizenship has been revoked following a final criminal conviction may be in one of several situations: criminal detention, immigration detention, or, if they have completed their sentence but have not yet been deported, living in a municipality. Since citizenship revocation often occurs near the end of criminal detention, and immigration detention can only be imposed for a limited time with the expectation of deportation, many expatriated terrorist offenders eventually end up residing in municipalities. In the Netherlands, municipalities are responsible for post-detention support, such as assistance with finding employment, securing income, obtaining insurance, and arranging housing. However, foreign nationals without legal residence in the Netherlands are not entitled to social services, except for limited access to medically necessary care and legal aid under Article 10 of the Aliens Act. Undocumented foreigners in the Netherlands do not have a valid citizen service number and therefore have no access to education or work. Non-citizens considered to pose a threat to national security furthermore have no access to shelters for undocumented foreigners. As a result, many are forced to rely on family or friends for housing or end up living on the streets.

The revocation of Dutch citizenship has serious implications for the support provided to ensure an individual’s safe reintegration into society. In some cases, this measure directly interferes with ongoing resocialization processes. One respondent from a municipality shared an example where there had been collaboration with the family to arrange housing, establish a social network, and provide medical assistance. The individual was prepared to resume life after detention and was willing to cooperate with their departure. Another respondent noted that some individuals had actively participated in their own reintegration, working for years on plans to return to their country of origin, including saving money, building a network, and visiting consulates to obtain a travel document. This example illustrates that, beyond halting resocialization efforts, citizenship revocation can also worsen the likelihood that individuals will voluntarily leave the country.

The interviews reveal that several municipalities have decided to exclude individuals whose Dutch citizenship has been permanently revoked from the individual-oriented approach. Some municipalities believe that the revocation complicates their work, requiring additional resources, while others argue that the revocation renders interventions impossible, making the approach meaningless. They see a direct conflict between the goals of the individual-oriented approach—such as societal integration and stability—and the purpose of citizenship revocation. Some municipalities also question the legal basis for continuing to support or stay in contact with these individuals outside the scope of the individual-oriented approach. However, not all municipalities take the same stance. Some continue to maintain contact or refer individuals to organizations that provide informal support for undocumented foreigners. A staff member from another municipality emphasized that while the national government should address the issue, these individuals still reside in the municipality, and maintaining contact with them is preferable.

The discontinuation of the individual-oriented approach after the revocation of citizenship also affects other actors involved in monitoring these individuals. When municipalities lose contact with an individual, other organizations, such as the police, have less information about their whereabouts and activities. The withdrawal of nationality reduces the visibility of these individuals for all partners involved in the approach, complicating the coordination of measures and interventions, as well as the exchange of information.

Does this mean that these people completely disappear from the radar? If the basis of the criminal law framework and the municipality’s responsibility for aftercare after detention is removed, there may still be other legal grounds on which the municipality or other actors have a duty or responsibility. If an individual’s presence in a municipality threatens public order and safety, the mayor has the authority to act on that basis. Additionally, immigration and counter-terrorism legislation allow for the imposition of supervision measures, such as reporting obligations or area bans. However, in practice, respondents noted that these measures are difficult to enforce, and violations are rarely criminally prosecuted. The limitations of contact and supervision raised by this research are causing significant concerns among municipalities, the Probation Service, and other stakeholders regarding their ability to monitor these individuals effectively. Moreover, these actors are concerned about what the lack of government support and intervention, combined with a marginalized existence in absence of a prospect of departure from the Netherlands, mean for recidivism—for example, the risk that they are drawn back into terrorist networks—and thus for reducing threats to the national security.

Conclusion

From a human security perspective, the practice of citizenship revocation, as discussed in this chapter with reference to the Netherlands, is deeply problematic. Addressing terrorist offences in the criminal justice system as part of the broader counter-terrorism strategy involves safe reintegration of offenders after detention in a prevention-oriented and individualized approach. Such an approach aligns well with human security principles. However, as this study demonstrates, the practice of citizenship revocation and its consequences directly undermine this approach. For example, it interferes with the execution of conditions imposed by criminal courts and excludes individuals from localized, individualized interventions aimed at preventing radicalization by fostering the development of their human potential. Moreover, the lack of such interventions potentially leads to a loss of contact and obscures the whereabouts and well-being of convicted terrorist offenders who have become non-citizens in legal limbo.

As previously noted, revocation of citizenship severs the bond between the individual and the state. Many convicted terrorist offenders whose Dutch citizenship is revoked are unable to leave the Netherlands and thus have no other state to turn to for protection of their human rights. Also problematic is that citizenship revocation aims to permanently break the bond with a selective group of offenders. Dual nationals are denied the second chance to participate in society that we offer mono-national offenders, only because they have two nationalities.

Returning to the questions that Scheinin urges be asked, it is questionable whether the restrictions on the exercise of human rights that are implied by citizenship revocation in the Netherlands are justifiable. The measure seems to serve as a symbolic expression of severing the bond between citizen and state, but it is difficult to assess whether the ‘benefit’ of such a symbolic act outweighs the rights restrictions it imposes. If the goal is to express disapproval of a citizen’s moral behavior, this could easily be achieved through a measure that has less of an impact on human rights—namely, through the criminal justice system. More importantly, there is no evidence to suggest that the revocation of citizenship and the subsequent legal limbo contribute to increased security. In fact, this study suggests that this approach could be counterproductive. While reversing the trend towards more use of citizenship revocation in many European (and other) states may be difficult in the current political climate, the sensible approach would be to use alternative measures that would be less damaging from a human security standpoint and more effective in enhancing national security.