*This article also appears as a chapter in the 2024 KCIS Conference volume that was published in Sept. 2025

Preface: For the second consecutive year, the Canadian Armed Forces and the United States Army War College Visiting Defence Fellows (VDFs) at the Centre for International and Defence Policy (CIDP), Queen’s University, were invited to contribute their perspectives to the Publication Series following the annual Kingston Consortium on International Security Conference. In 2024, the VDFs’ offering is military practitioners' reflections on the conference theme, War and Human Security in an Ever-Changing World, as well as on selected ideas and discussions that emerged during the event.

Introduction

            There is no question that Canada, the United States of America and their militaries find themselves in an ever-changing world. Many speakers and panelists at the 2024 Kingston Consortium on International Security (KCIS) Conference highlighted the ongoing changes in international relations and the uncertainty surrounding the future world order. Strikingly for the Visiting Defence Fellows (VDFs) as military practitioners, Canada’s Chief of Defence Staff, General Jennie Carignan, emphasized that the Canadian Armed Forces have a five-year window to implement the changes necessary to adapt to the evolving world order, shifts within the profession of arms, and emerging threats to Canada’s security. This urgency is underscored by the widely recognized reality that transitional operations are the most difficult to manage.[1] This highlights the complexity confronting the currently understrength Canadian Armed Forces, which must seize the narrowing window of opportunity to develop the capacities, competencies, and people of character to affect multi-deterrence—that is, the ability to operate in multi-domain, multi-polar, multi-dimensional, and multi-regional conflicts—before the opportunity for transformation slips away.[2] This raises the question: given limited time and a myriad of competing demands, where does human security fit within the Canadian Armed Forces' priority of work for change, and does it even have a rightful place there?

The concept of human security, introduced in the United Nations (UN) Development Programme's 1994 report New Dimensions of Human Security[3] and more precisely characterized in the 2012 UN General Assembly resolution 66/290,[4] adopts a people-centric and context-specific lens. This perspective, reflected in the three pillars of the UN’s human security approach—Freedom from Fear, Freedom from Want, and Freedom to Live in Dignity—underscores the interconnectedness of root causes that threaten people across the globe.[5] While the interrelationship between economic, food, health, personal, environmental, community, and cultural and political insecurities[6] is unquestioned, the conference participants' opinions on addressing human security issues were often contradictory. Take, for example, the juxtaposition of the recommendation to “not securitize all issues. Together, we need to think about how to better profile the human element so it is not an afterthought and viewed as something nice to be done when feasible”[7] with the reality that “in [the Baltic] region, in light of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, security has become something omnipresent,…has seemed to infuse all parts of public debate, [and]… somehow everything becomes framed as a security issue.”[8] Addressing these wicked problems requires multifaceted and comprehensive responses and is beyond the capability of any single entity.[9]

Figure 1: Representation of the United Nation’s Human Security Approach[10]

The Canadian military and the Department of National Defence have supporting functions but are not the sole and, often, not the central agency or department to appropriately lead the promotion of human security domestically and abroad; the Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic or DIME, its expanded DIME-FIL[11], or the MIDFIELD[12] models, often used to illustrate that the instruments of a nation’s power extend beyond military functions alone, underscore this point. However, during KCIS 2024, it was observed that many of the potential solutions and suggestions proposed by panelists regarding what Canada could, should, or must do to address human security needs often focused on the Canadian Armed Forces or, more vaguely, toward “Defence” as the primary delivery mechanism of Canada’s response to human insecurity. A first and somewhat defensive reaction as military professionals was to question the actionability or practicability of the arguably ambitious, ambiguous, and all-encompassing notion of human security.[13] This “solutioneering” tendency was quickly set aside, giving way to a recognition that so long as the concept delivers tangible results in reducing threats to people, human security’s theoretical imprecision becomes a secondary concern. Thus, the VDFs’ contemplation naturally evolved to question the assertions and recommendations through a reasonableness lens: what is reasonable to expect as our militaries’ role within possible national approaches?

Figure 2: Elements of national power: the DIME, DIME-FIL, & MIDFIELD acronyms.[14]

This chapter explores how current Canadian Armed Forces doctrine, policy, and practices implicitly align with human security by sampling strategic, operational, and tactical examples. Building on Vincent J. Curtis's critique of the notion that implicit actions are inherently less valuable than explicit ones,[15] the chapter highlights the often-overlooked ways the Canadian Armed Forces have internalized and operationalized key elements of the human security approach. Drawing from the Chief of Defence Staff's assertion that “perfectionism is the enemy of good enough” and their emphasizing the need for the Canadian Armed Forces to focus on achieving progress rather than striving for “victory” with its institutional objectives,[16] this chapter concludes by questioning whether the energy and effort required to fully “explicitize” a human security doctrine within the Canadian Armed Forces are justified. It asks whether such an undertaking is necessary or if the Canadian Armed Forces' implicit integration is already “good enough.”

Figure 3: Visual representation of the Levels of War.[17]

Political-Strategic

Theoretically, using military capabilities to achieve and maintain human security— implicitly including enforcement—contradicts the UN’s vision that “human security does not entail the threat or the use of force or coercive measures.”[18] This tension comes to light when one considers that “a military is created and controlled by the state [and]…is given an initial degree of legitimacy to defend the state and its interest through its monopoly on the use of coercive means.”[19] In theory and practice, the capacity to use force, to threaten the use of force, and to have the authority to apply force are determinants of a military force's efficacy. It also logically follows that the employment of military organizations immediately infringes on one of the three pillars of the UN’s human security approach: Freedom from Fear. Nonetheless, at the Political-Strategic level, the Government of Canada has directed via its recent defence policy update, Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence, that the “Canadian Armed Forces will also continue to promote the integration of human security considerations into planning, emphasizing the prevention of escalation in conflict zones, and collaborating with partners to address cross-cutting issues such as the protection of civilians and the impact of technology on security.”[20] Moreover, in July 2024, at the Washington Summit, the heads of state and government of the North Atlantic Alliance committed to integrating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) human security agenda.[21] These are essential political-strategic signals to the Canadian defence community regarding a renewed emphasis on human security.

For this chapter, the report on the NATO Human Security Agenda,[22] issued at the Washington Summit, is beneficial in two crucial ways. Firstly, it was accepted by Canada and the United States of America, allowing VDFs from both nations to make observations from a shared baseline. Secondly, it offers a codified human security model whose scope is adjusted to the framework of a political-military alliance. The NATO model consists of five key areas of work: the Protection of Civilians, Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings, Children and Armed Conflict, and Cultural Property Protection.[23]

Figure 3. Visual depiction of NATO’s human security model.[24]

The legitimacy of the profession of arms in Canada is founded upon its servicemembers’ adherence to authorized controls that are enforced through the chain of command. This adherence, especially when facing adversaries without such controls, represents a pinnacle of military professionalism. The Canadian Armed Forces' operational effectiveness depends on the nature of the mission, the granted authorities, and compliance with applicable Canadian and international law, ethics, doctrine, and policies.[25] The Canadian government's explicit recognition of human security in its defence policy update and endorsement of NATO's human security agenda send a clear signal to the Canadian Armed Forces' military-strategic leadership.[26] These political-strategic directives highlight the evolving nature of security in a changing world.

The Our North, Strong and Free defence policy document leverages similarly broad human security themes and objectives to those contained in the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept, which has been criticized for using “vague and open-ended” human security agenda commitments that lack specific direction.[27] Notably, NATO’s conceptualization of human security as a “multi-sectoral approach to security that identifies and addresses widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of the people” is derived from the UN’s approach.[28] NATO has endeavoured to mainstream human security principles across the alliance since it released the Strategic Concept in 2022. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the corresponding direct and collateral targeting of civilians has been suggested as the catalyst for this mainstreaming effort, positing that NATO’s military leadership may have been forced to acknowledge that human security issues, namely civilian harm mitigation, could no longer be considered secondary to warfighting.[29]

In contrast to the above assertion, the VDFs suggest that, in practice, human security principles are not fundamentally at odds with warfighting; however, those in the profession of arms require concrete human security tasks or obligations that would apply to high-intensity conflict beyond those already embedded in International Humanitarian Law. The lack of specific human security objectives will limit the ability of military planners to incorporate desired human security outcomes in campaign plans or operations orders beyond peripheral statements, which generally seek to demonstrate that the human security pillars have been broadly considered during planning. If human security remains a conceptual approach that lacks specific and measurable tasks for warfighters, it is unlikely that it will achieve the emphasis being sought by proponents; challenges such as climate change or food insecurity will seldom be prioritized by combatants implicated in large-scale combat operations against a peer adversary in a conventional armed conflict. There is a risk that those human security-related tasks undertaken by the Canadian Armed Forces during decades of peace support operations and years of counter-insurgency and stability operations have created unrealistic expectations that the Canadian Armed Forces will retain the capacity to deliver similar effects in a high-intensity warfighting scenario.

Military-Strategic

            At the Military-Strategic level, the Canadian Armed Forces' most essential doctrine is The Canadian Armed Forces Ethos: Trusted to Serve, published in 2022. This doctrine identifies “respecting the dignity of all persons” as its core ethical principle.[30] This value holds equal precedence within the Code of Values and Ethics, which applies to the broader Defence Team, encompassing both Department of National Defence employees and Canadian Armed Forces members.[31] Trusted to Serve highlights that respecting the dignity of all individuals is “the foundation of [Canadian] military ethics”[32] [emphasis added]; implicitly, this is a direct reinforcement of the Freedom to Live in Dignity pillar of the UN’s human security approach.

Figure 4: The CAF Ethos: Trusted to Serve & DND/CAF Code of Values and Ethics.

The Code of Conduct for Canadian Forces Personnel is another central component of Canadian Armed Forces doctrine, applicable to armed conflicts and peace support operations.[33] This code, based on International Humanitarian Law, is written in plain and understandable language and establishes minimum standards for the conduct of military personnel. Its purpose is threefold: to limit unnecessary human suffering [(Freedom from Fear)], ensure respect for human dignity [(Freedom to Live in Dignity)], and facilitate peace restoration.[34] The code’s eleven rules closely align with four of the NATO human security model’s areas of work: the Protection of Civilians (Rules 1-11); Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (Rules 4, 5, 6, and 11); Children and Armed Conflict (Rules 2, 4, 6, and 11); and Cultural Property Protection (Rules 2, 9, and 11). This code reflects the Canadian Armed Forces’ adherence to International Humanitarian Law and underscores their implicit integration of human security aspects within their doctrine.

Figure 5: The eleven rules of the Code of Conduct for Canadian Forces Personnel.[35]

Canada's proactive stance on child protection in conflict further exemplifies this commitment to human security. Canada is a recognized leader as a staunch advocate for the prevention of the recruitment and use of child soldiers and launched the Vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and the Prevention of the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers in 2017.[36] This led to the Canadian Armed Forces establishing the Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security in 2019 as part of the Canadian Defence Academy. This Centre of Excellence serves as a lasting platform for research and education aimed at preventing the recruitment and use of child soldiers. It also addresses other human security topics pertinent to the operations, doctrine, and training of the Canadian Armed Forces.[37]

Mainstreaming the broader perspective of human security as part of the Canadian Armed Forces’ “anticipate” function[38] is a key recommendation from the introduction of Evolving Human Security: Frameworks and Considerations for Canada's Military, a special volume on human security that was commissioned by the Canadian Armed Forces and published in 2023 by the Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security.[39] When considering this idea, it is vital to recognize the Defence Intelligence Enterprise's role within Canada’s overall intelligence architecture. Defence intelligence is one of several federal intelligence institutions, including the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Communications Security Establishment. Collectively, these agencies conduct multi-dimensional security assessments, including monitoring threats to human security around the globe and within Canada.

Figure 6: Depiction of the Canadian Intelligence Community. Research and graphic by: Grey Dynamics.[40] Image used with permission from Grey Dynamics, 2025.

Human security threat assessment is not the exclusive purview of Defence, which is charged principally, but not exclusively, with military-related intelligence as part of this whole-of-government approach to intelligence. While defence intelligence plays an important role, like the other agencies, it has a specific national security mandate. Calls for the defence intelligence to expand its intelligence responsibilities significantly or to prioritize human security as the central lens for all its activities need to acknowledge that Canada already employs a collaborative information-sharing framework in which defence intelligence is implicitly involved in human security threat analysis. Moreover, if heeded, such calls risk diluting defence intelligence's focus and jeopardizing its capacity to deliver on its mandated area of expertise within Canada's national security framework. Even in the current environment, there is a dependency on defence intelligence for collection and analysis outside the core mandate of the Department of National Defence, and there is potential that this has or will stymie the creation and maintenance of appropriate systems, capabilities, and accountability within other departments. This phenomenon was possibly observed in Canada’s pandemic readiness prior to the COVID-19 outbreak. It was identified that the medical intelligence branch of Canadian Forces Intelligence Command had reported more accurate and timely information on the origin and spread of COVID-19 than did Public Health Agency Canada—the department with the primary mandate to prevent and control infectious diseases.[41] While defence medical intelligence is primarily oriented to support strategic and operational military planning, it also has an evolving role in the prevention of strategic surprise from such events as biological weapon attack, alongside key allied military intelligence partners.[42] It is in the latter context that defence intelligence furnished such valuable pandemic reporting; however, a more robust or specific human security agenda might compel or encourage the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces to undertake such horizon scanning for the purposes of public health as a core mandate, in the absence of adequate civilian structures, which would undoubtedly have negative longer term implications for the support given to military planning and operations. It is a zero-sum game and undertaking additional or more specific human security tasks will come at the expense of those previously inherent combat functions.

From an institutional-strategic perspective, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces continue to advance the mainstreaming of gender and intersectional perspectives, critical components within the broader human security approach and the key integrator function of NATO's human security model that cross-cuts all five areas of work (refer to Figure 3, above).[43] As part of Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security,[44] the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces have prepared a detailed implementation plan where Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings are elements of its Focus Area 4.[45] Moreover, the Department of National Defence supports Public Safety Canada’s leadership of the National Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking.[46] The Director for Gender Equality and Intersectional Analysis continues to lead and coordinate the organizations’ gender and intersectional mainstreaming efforts. A tactile example of the Canadian Armed Forces mainstreaming efforts is the piloting, in early 2024, of a new course called “Institutionalization of GBA Plus in Defence.” This course involves a Defence Team-focused exploration of topics and practical skills related to conducting GBA Plus analysis across different functional areas across the institution.

Before investigating examples at the operational level, it is crucial to highlight the recent release of the second edition of the Canadian Military Doctrine manual in May 2024; the Canadian Armed Forces’ “capstone doctrine that describes the strategic context and provides guidance on how [the Canadian Armed Forces] and its partners operate.”[47] Significantly, this second edition includes a new annex dedicated to cross-cutting topics that could affect Canada’s future military missions. Subsections of this annex explicitly speak to each of the five areas of work from the NATO human security model and about Gender and Women, Peace and Security: the key integrator function in the NATO model. Other subsections speak to Sexual Exploitation and Building Integrity. This annex concludes by underscoring that human security, given its exclusion of the use of force or coercive measures, is not regarded as a cross-cutting issue by the Canadian Armed Forces but rather as a complementary component within a comprehensive approach.[48] This capstone joint doctrine describes a changing strategic context and is a critical nexus between the strategic and operational levels.  

Figure 7: Hierarchy of Canadian Armed Forces doctrine.[49]

Operational Level

The operational level bridges the strategic and tactical levels, guiding how military forces organize, deploy, and employ resources to achieve strategic objectives.[50] In Canada, operational and joint military doctrine are often consolidated within a single library, and in practice, the terms are used interchangeably. Human security considerations implicitly appear in most volumes within the joint doctrine collection. A sampling of publications that are closely aligned with human security is indicative:

1999:   Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War[51]

2001:   Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels [52]

2002:   Peace Support Operations [53]

2005:   Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Operations [54]

2007:   Code of Conduct for Canadian Forces Personnel [55]

2008:   Use of Force for CF Operations [56]

2011:   Domestic Operations [57]

2014:   Targeting, 1st Edition [58]

2024:   Canadian Military Doctrine, 2nd Edition [59]

Each of these volumes includes plain-language explanations of broad concepts and theories and describes several considerations for military personnel as part of the planning and preparations for and the execution of military operations. For example, the Use of Force for Canadian Forces Operations has sections dedicated to explaining the difference between the use of force in the conduct of an armed conflict and other situations; the Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels explores military necessity, humanity and chivalry, as well as protections to be afforded to various classes of objects, to civilians and to those who are hors de combat. Collectively, these documents have significant content implicitly correlated to four of the NATO model’s work areas, namely, Protection of Civilians, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, Children and Armed Conflict, and Cultural Property Protection. While Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings features less prominently, it is notable that, in several areas, joint military doctrine speaks to crimes against humanity, which explicitly includes enslavement. Moreover, as part of the support to a law-enforcement function,[60] the Canadian Armed Forces may assist police and other law-enforcement partners with their mandates to stop criminal activities such as human trafficking.[61]

On a practical level, though often overlooked or underreported, the Canadian Armed Forces’ most significant and consistent contribution to domestic operations is arguably its operational capacity.[62] The Canadian Armed Forces maintain six geographically based Regional Joint Task Force (RJTF) Headquarters that provide operational-level military command for elements deployed domestically. In addition to overseeing domestic military operations, these headquarters have well-established and strong relationships with territorial, provincial, and municipal emergency management organizations.[63] These civil-military interactions extend beyond consequence management and occur through regular joint working groups and through participating in joint exercises.[64] Through their liaison with regional authorities, the RJTFs actively contribute to and gain valuable insights into the context-specific challenges of the provinces and territories. While the Canadian Armed Forces serve predominantly in a supporting role domestically, these collaborative experiences involving RJTF personnel enhance joint decision-making processes and reinforce Canada’s resilience at many levels.[65] Viewed through the lens of the NATO human security model, these outcomes are implicitly related to and reinforcing of human security.[66]

Although not always explicitly referred to as such, the Canadian Armed Forces' operational level often implicitly integrates human security principles. This integration is evident through numerous joint publications that implicitly address various facets of NATO’s human security model, which, in turn, facilitate practical application at the tactical level. The connection between the operational and tactical levels is particularly crucial due to the impact of the “Strategic Corporal within a Three-Block War” concept, which illustrates the overlap of combat and non-combat roles of military forces in conflict and underscores the potential strategic consequences of decisions made by junior leaders in the field.

Tactical Level

It would be difficult to overstate the impact of General Charles C. Krulak’s 1999 Marine Corps Gazette article “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War”[67] on tactical level thinking with the Canadian Armed Forces in the 2000s. This clear articulation that small military units would be involved simultaneously in activities spanning the breadth of the spectrum of conflict within a small operational area and that decisions taken by junior leaders could have strategic consequences resonated deeply. So deeply, in fact, that the near wholesale adoption of the concept by the Canadian Armed Forces was the subject of critical analysis at the Canadian Forces College[68] and its resonance permeated beyond the confines of defence discourse to the point that, in 2005, the tactical-level concept was extrapolated to the political-strategic level and featured explicitly in the overview of Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World.[69]

            Figure 8: A visualization of the Three-Block War concept.[70]

Within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, the concept, which underscores the military's potential roles outside of exclusively warfighting, including possible support to humanitarian relief, reconstruction, and stabilization operations, was discussed at all levels. Its foundational ideas are reflected in the Canadian Armed Forces' discourse around the Joint, Interagency, Multi-national, Public (JIMP) concept,[71] within tactical-level focused ethics publications like Duty with Discernment: [Commander Canadian Army] guidance on ethics in operations,[72] and in adopting the full-spectrum operations construct within the Canadian Army’s doctrine.[73] Today, the Canadian Armed Forces’ pan-domain force employment concept[74] is a natural evolution that explicitly includes the addition of the cyber and space domains. Like NATO’s human security model, this evolution in military thinking places increased emphasis on integrating efforts and is both prevention- and protection-oriented.

Figure 9: The Canadian Armed Forces’ Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept.

As previously mentioned in the military-strategic section, prevention and protection of civilians, including children, during conflicts is one of the work areas of NATO’s human security model and an area of strong emphasis within the Canadian Armed Forces. In February 2017, the Canadian Armed Forces published a Joint Doctrine Note (JDN 2017-01) regarding child soldiers,[75] the recruitment and use of which is one of the six grave violations affecting children. In 2023, JDN 2023-01: Canadian Armed Forces Responses to Preventing the Unlawful Recruitment and Use of Children in Conflict[76] was published and is a companion to JDN 2017-01. While captured under the umbrella of joint doctrine, which in the Canadian context is often associated with the operational level, these JDNs offer guidance to individual servicemembers, tactical unit commanders, and their staffs on how to face the realities of conflicts involving child soldiers and to promote the safety of child soldiers and Canadian Armed Forces personnel.[77],[78] The impact of JDN 2017-01 is helpful to review as it has been in service for seven years. The JDN stimulated important efforts within the Canadian Armed Forces, including a Chief of Defence Staff Planning/Initiating Directive, needs assessment and professional development needs analysis, and the development of doctrine and training roadmaps.[79] At the tactical level, child soldier awareness training is part of pre-deployment training regimes, and the Canadian Army includes child-soldier-specific scenarios in its flagship military planning course, the Army Operations Course.

From the perspective of the Protection of Civilians, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, and Cultural Property Protection, the Canadian Armed Forces continuously create and revise their tactics, techniques, and procedures. Learning about the theory and practical aspects of the Law of Armed Conflict, the designation and classification of civilians and property, and rules of engagement are part of formal professional development, including collective training and refresher activities throughout one's career. Mission-specific practical rehearsals during pre-deployment training and in-theatre refresher activities using vignettes are fully integrated as standard practices in the Canadian Armed Forces. The aforementioned Use of Force for Canadian Forces Operations manual includes guidance for domestic and expeditionary mission planners about interventions by servicemembers to stop serious crimes, such as sexual violence.[80] As part of efforts to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, the Canadian Armed Forces provides pre-deployment training on recognizing and reporting human trafficking, including signs of sexual exploitation, trafficking, prostitution, and child soldier recruitment, and emphasizes vigilance during missions.[81]

The Canadian Armed Forces is committed to the self-improvement of its people and of the organization. The Canadian Armed Forces’ lessons-learned systems are important in promoting organizational awareness and managing policy, procedural, and practical adjustments. The Army Lessons Learned Centre has contributed to the implicit internalization of human security factors within the Canadian Army. The Army Lessons Learned Centre's Bulletin 8.1 includes personal observations by junior officers on Leadership at the Platoon Level in Peace Support Operations,[82] and its Newsletter 15.2 includes a lessons-identified summary from Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief missions.[83] Many volumes from the Centre’s Dispatches series have covered several human security-related topics like The Law of Armed Conflict, Peace Support Operations and You,[84] Rules of Engagement Training,[85] Negotiations during Peace Support Operations,[86] and Operations in a Degraded Environment: Considerations during a Pandemic.[87]

Figure 10: A cover image from the Army Lessons Learned Centre’s Newsletter.

As discussed previously, mainstreaming gender and intersectional perspectives is not only central to the Women, Peace and Security agenda but is also the key integration function of NATO's human security model that crosscuts all five areas of work. As operations-focused organizations, the tactical units and formations in the Canadian Armed Forces benefit from NATO Advanced Distributed Learning courses available through the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations in Sweden. The Role of the Gender Advisor and Gender Focal Area in Operations (ADL168), Improving Operational Effectiveness by Integrating Gender Perspectives (ADL169), and the Gender Focal Point (ADL171) courses are meaningful learning instruments to support general service officers and non-commissioned staff officers with planning and executing operations at the tactical level. In contrast, the residential Gender in Military Operations Gender Advisor course (ACT493) remains a flagship developmental activity for Canadian Armed Forces servicemembers employed as Gender Advisors.[88]

The Canadian Armed Forces' tactical-level practices align with the guiding principles of the UN’s human security approach as well as the NATO model. Notwithstanding the use of different terminology, the tactical level’s emphasis on training and practical application, particularly in areas like child soldier protection, the law of armed conflict, and the integration of gender perspectives, already prepares tactical-level units to address human security concerns in real-world situations.

Conclusion

Deciding what not to do is as important as deciding what to do.

- Steve Jobs. Quoted by Walter Isaacson[89]

This chapter’s exploration of the Canadian Armed Forces' existing doctrine and practices, from the political-strategic to the tactical level, reveals a consistent, although implicit, integration of human security considerations. While formal doctrines and policies may not always explicitly reference “human security,” the practical application of these concepts is evident in training, operational procedures, and the lessons learned from various missions. The depth and breadth of extant institutionalization raises a crucial question: is the current implicit approach “good enough,” or is explicit Canadian Armed Forces doctrine necessary? Indeed, there are potential advantages to adopting a human security doctrine for the Canadian Armed Forces, such as enhancing clarity and consistency, increasing awareness of the concept, and improving mutual understanding with other agencies that employ a human security lens. Interrogating deeply into the potential benefits is beyond the scope of this chapter; it is unnecessary given that the Canadian Armed Forces has already engaged in this conversation through its commissioning of the special volume, Evolving Human Security: Frameworks and Considerations for Canada’s Military, produced by its Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security.

As of September 2024, the Canadian Armed Forces remain understrength by approximately 8,700 personnel,[90] a gap reduction of approximately 6,700 from the year prior.[91] While this represents important progress, the deficiency still represents a significant gap in human resources and institutional experience. This shortfall limits the Canadian Armed Forces' total cognitive capacity, which is crucial to meeting its “achieving progress” goals. As emphasized by the Chief of Defence Staff, these five-year horizon goals include becoming a multi-deterrent-capable military within an evolving world order and continuing the necessary cultural evolution within the profession of arms. We must therefore critically assess whether the expenditure of the effort, time, and resources required to fully “explicitize” a bespoke human security doctrine for the Canadian Armed Forces is warranted, given the considerable cognitive demands already being placed on the understrength organization.

Figure 11: Imagery. Balancing wants with limited resources; Visualizing good enough in relation to perfect as functions of value and effort[92]

Should the Canadian Armed Forces determine that the evolving security landscape necessitates an explicit and formalized human security doctrine, the Canadian Armed Forces could explore “economy of effort” options. One approach could be to adopt an existing framework or model, such as those proposed by contributors to Evolving Human Security […], or to adopt the NATO human security model wholesale. Alternatively, as has been done in the past for other doctrinal publications, the Canadian Armed Forces could collaborate with its Allies to adapt and modify their existing doctrine. For instance, the United Kingdom’s Joint Service Publication 985: Human Security[93] provides an example that could be tailored to meet Canada’s needs. While such approaches would still require a degree of intellectual investment from the Canadian Armed Forces, they would leverage existing expertise and reduce the burden of conceiving and writing an entirely new doctrine.

However, as this chapter has described, the Canadian Armed Forces has already implicitly institutionalized and operationalized many of the principles underpinning the Protection of Civilians, Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings, Children and Armed Conflict, and Cultural Property Protection and the mainstreaming of gender and intersectional perspectives. With their substantive inclusion as explicit cross-cutting themes within Canadian Military Doctrine, 2nd Edition, expending additional Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces intellectual efforts or undertaking contracted support in the pursuit of “explicitization” is a solution in search of a problem and a case where the desire for perfectionism is indeed the enemy of good enough.

Postscript

The VDFs believe that human security researchers must address the challenges modern militaries are facing, where the key objective of defending against or attacking an adversary in a conventional warfighting scenario must be balanced against the human security expectations placed on those same forces. While peace support and stability operations will always form part of the Canadian Armed Forces’ deployable capabilities, most current Canadian Armed Forces operations, training and major equipment procurements are focused on deterrence or readiness for a future large-scale conventional military conflict. Ultimately, the Canadian Armed Forces’ role in domestic and international operations is to apply the military’s capabilities toward tactical, operational, and strategic objectives to ensure national security and support our allies' goals in coalition operations. The Canadian Armed Forces are trained and expected to prioritize the components of human security and its considerations. They will stop serious crimes against humanity, such as sexual violence and trafficking, within the approved authorities and allocated capabilities for each specific operational mission. However, in its current state, the Canadian Armed Forces is not structured to be the proponent or lead agency to combat or eliminate human insecurity, but rather can, when so authorized, apply combat power and operational support to the endeavour within a whole-of-government or comprehensive approach.

The VDFs further ask whether the human security approach in this context is merely the application of International Humanitarian Law or whether theoretical or applied research is of further value. Importantly for the Canadian Armed Forces, its senior leadership must determine the relative value of any such research compared to other focus areas, such as operationalizing the pan-domain command and control concept or developing multi-deterrence doctrine, given that the Canadian Armed Forces find themselves in a time when the total ambition and time available for its change agenda likely exceeds available resources.

Unlike a broad human security approach that excludes coercion and the use of force, the Law of Armed Conflict contains clear minimum standards that can be practically incorporated into military planning and the conduct of operations at all levels, including at the individual level.[94] It constitutes a victim-focused legal obligation, and the principles of distinction, proportionality, military necessity, limitation, good faith, humane treatment and non-discrimination are already doctrinally and culturally interwoven within the Canadian Armed Forces.

It is possible that, sometime in the foreseeable future, the multi-polar, great power competition paradigm may cause Canada to reflect on its international treaty and convention obligations related to anti-personnel landmines, certain conventional weapons, cluster munitions, chemical weapons, open skies, or even the testing and employment of nuclear weapons.[95] Therefore, this new era may also be a catalyst for a re-evaluation of the human security agenda and the roles the Canadian Armed Forces could reasonably be expected to play in such a conflict. Finally, it is suggested that the war in Ukraine offers researchers a harsh case study of human security in the face of prolonged, high-intensity state-on-state conflict. One may ask whether a people-centric approach for military organizations is practical or even meaningful under such circumstances.

End Notes:

[1] See Carignan, Day 2 Closing Keynote Address and Burke and Major, “New Chief of the Defence Staff Says Canada Has 5 Years to Prepare for Emerging Threats.”

[2] Carignan, Day 2 Closing Keynote Address.

[3] United Nations Development Programme, UNDP Human Development Report 1994.

[4] United Nations General Assembly, UN A/RES/66/290.

[5] United Nations Human Security Unit, Human Security Handbook.

[6] These seven main categories of threats to human security appear in the UNDP, Human Development Report 1994. New Dimensions of Human Security: pp. 24-25.

[7] Rassi, Day 1 Closing Keynote Address.

[8] Pildegovičs, Day 2 Opening Keynote Address.

[9] Gallopín, “Uncertainty: The New Situation: 178–84.

[10] United Nations Human Security Unit, Human Security Handbook: 4.

[11] For example, see Rodriguez, Walton, and Chu, “Putting the ‘FIL’ into ‘DIME’: Growing Joint Understanding of the Instruments of Power.”

[12] For example, see Phillips and Corcoran, “Harnessing America’s Power.”

[13] For a concise collection of varied perspectives on the concept of human security, see Burgess and Owen, “Special Section: What Is ‘Human Security’?”

[14] Figure based upon a graphic in Weber, “Playing the MIDFIELD.”

[15] Curtis, “Human Security and the Canadian Armed Forces.”: 276-77.

[16] Carignan, Day 2 Closing Keynote Address.

[17] Figure inspired by Canada. Department of National Defence, Fighting Spirit: 70; Canada. Department of National Defence, Leading the Institution: 45, 48; Shekleton, “Developing Strategic Leaders.”; and Sukman, “The Institutional Level of War.”

[18] United Nations General Assembly, UN A/RES/66/290.

[19] Canada. Department of National Defence, Fighting Spirit: 12.

[20] Canada. Department of National Defence, Our North, Strong and Free: 14.

[21] NATO, “NATO Washington Summit Declaration.”

[22] NATO, NATO Human Security Agenda Report.

[23] NATO, NATO Human Security Agenda Report: 6.

[24] Ibid: 7.

[25] Canada. Department of National Defence, Fighting Spirit: 12

[26] Canada, “Prime Minister Strengthens Defence and Security Partnerships at the NATO Summit.”

[27] Heard and Thue, “A New Era? NATO’s Prioritisation of Human Security in an Insecure World.”

[28] NATO, “Human Security - Approach and Guiding Principles.”

[29] Heard and Thue, “A New Era? NATO’s Prioritisation of Human Security in an Insecure World.”

[30] Canada. Department of National Defence, Trusted to Serve: 2.

[31] Canada. Department of National Defence, DND/CAF Code of Values and Ethics: 9.

[32] Canada. Department of National Defence, Trusted to Serve: 2.

[33] Canada. Department of National Defence, Code of Conduct for Canadian Forces Personnel: 1-1.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid: 3-1.

[36] Canada. Global Affairs Canada, “The Vancouver Principles.”

[37] Canada. Department of National Defence, “Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security.”

[38] Canada’s approach to Defence: “Anticipate. Adapt. Act.” is articulated in Canada. Department of National Defence, Strong, Secure, Engaged: 63-67.

[39] Lewis-Simpson and Meharg, editors, Evolving Human Security: 7-22.

[40] Balodis, “Canada’s Intelligence Community”: https://greydynamics.com/canadas-intelligence-community-an-overview-2/.

[41] Brewster, Murray. “Military Medical Intelligence Warnings Gathered Dust as Public Health Struggled to Define COVID-19.” News. CBC, January 11, 2021. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/covid-military-medical-intelligence-1.5866627.

[42] Ibid.

[43] For this chapter, institutional-strategic refers to the management level for “the business” of defence and its bureaucracy. For an interesting perspective on an “institutional level” being a parallel level of war applicable in the United States context, see Sukman, “The Institutional Level of War.”

[44] Canada, “Foundations for Peace.”

[45] Canada. Department of National Defence, “DND/CAF CNAP3 Implementation Plan.”

[46] Canada. Public Safety Canada, National Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking 2019-2024.

[47] Canada. Department of National Defence, CFJP 01: Canadian Military Doctrine: Letter of Promulgation.

[48] Ibid: pp. B-1 to B-10.

[49] Canada. Department of National Defence, Royal Canadian Air Force Doctrine: 1-4.

[50] Ibid.: pp. 2-22 to 2-24.

[51] Canada. Department of National Defence, CIMIC in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War.

[52] Canada. Department of National Defence, CFJP 3-01: LOAC at the Operational and Tactical Levels.

[53] Canada. Department of National Defence, CAF JDM: Peace Support Operations.

[54] Canada. Department of National Defence, Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Operations.

[55] Canada. Department of National Defence, Code of Conduct for Canadian Forces Personnel.

[56] Canada. Department of National Defence, CFJP 5.1: Use of Force for CF Operations.

[57] Canada. Department of National Defence, CFJP 3-2: Domestic Operations.

[58] Canada. Department of National Defence, CFJP 3-9: Targeting.

[59] Canada. Department of National Defence, CFJP 01: Canadian Military Doctrine.

[60] National Defence Act, RSC, 1985, c. N-5.

[61] Canada. Department of National Defence, “Assistance to Law Enforcement Operations.”

[62] Leuprecht, “The Moral Hazard in Using the Canadian Military as Provincial First Responders.”

[63] Canada. Department of National Defence, “RJTFs.”

[64] For example, see Taschner, “Armed Forces Touch down in North Bay for Emergency Training This Weekend” and Forsythe, “Ex DOMESTIC JUNO II Trains Reservists on Domestic Emergency Response.”

[65] Robbins, “Regional Liaison Officer Course Confirms JTFC’s Ability to Effectively Communicate with Civilian First Responders during Domestic Operations.”

[66] NATO, NATO Human Security Agenda Report: 14.

[67] Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War.”

[68] Dorn, “Three-Block War: A Critical Analysis.”

[69] Canada. Foreign Affairs Canada., A Role of Pride and Influence in the World.

[70] Annis, “Krulak Revisited.”

[71] For example, see Gizewski and Rostek, “Toward a JIMP-Capable Land Force.”

[72] Walker, Duty with Discernment.

[73] Canada. Department of National Defence, Act: The Operational Function.

[74] Canada. Department of National Defence, Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept.

[75] Canada. Department of National Defence, CAF JDN 2017-01.

[76] Canada. Department of National Defence, CAF JDN 2023-01.

[77] Rehman, “CAF Develop Doctrine to Address Deployed Military Personnel Confronted by Child Soldiers.”

[78] Canada. Department of National Defence, “Canadian Armed Forces Sets Precedent with Child Soldier Doctrine.”

[79] Canada. Department of National Defence, “Canadian Army Directive on Child Soldiers Doctrine and Training Development.”

[80] Canada. Department of National Defence, CFJP 5.1: Use of Force for CF Operations.

[81] Canada. Public Safety Canada, National Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking. Annual Report 2020-2021: 18.

[82] Latinovich, Gallo, and Lowe, “Leadership at the Platoon Level in PSO.”

[83] Canada. Department of National Defence, “Humanitarian Operation and Disaster Relief Missions – Lessons Identified Summary.”

[84] Canada. Department of National Defence, “LOAC, PSO and You.”

[85] Canada. Department of National Defence, “Rules of Engagement Training.”

[86] Canada. Department of National Defence, “Negotiations during Peace Support Operations.”

[87] Canada. Department of National Defence, “Operations in a Degraded Environment: Considerations during a Pandemic.”

[88] Canada. Department of National Defence, “CANFORGEN 049/24.”

[89] Isaacson, “The Real Leadership Lessons of Steve Jobs.”: 94.

[90] Canada. House of Commons. Standing Committee on National Defence, “NDDN Number 115.”

[91] Canada. House of Commons. Standing Committee on National Defence, “NDDN Number 071.”

[92] Image repurposed from Rahman, “How Does Satisficing Influence User Behavior in UI/UX Design?”

[93] United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, UK JSP 985.

[94] International Committee of the Red Cross, Introduction to the Law of Armed Conflict.

[95] For example, would Canada follow Poland and the Baltic states in reconsidering its ratification of the Ottawa Convention in the face of existential threats to its sovereignty or the survivability of its personnel in high-intensity conflicts at home or abroad? See: Luckhurst, “Poland and Baltics to Quit Landmine Treaty over Russia Fears.”