*This article also appears as a chapter in the 2024 KCIS Conference volume that was published in Sept. 2025

 Notions of human security are evolving. Where questions of security once had a completely military or policing aspect to them, contemporary perspectives are often much broader, with non-traditional points of view coming to the fore. The “VUCA” (volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous) term, while a concise encapsulation of the world with which we are confronted, does not truly capture all of the dimensions at play in the security realm in light of a shifting focus towards the “well-being, dignity, and rights of individuals.” Accepting that the security space includes ideas like those first put forward in the United Nations’ Development Report of 1994, what does this mean for the military profession?[1] Do militaries need to consider changing their role and purpose? Looking specifically at Canada and the Canadian military, are there implications that need to be addressed?

From a historical perspective, and in general terms, militaries have existed since their inception to exercise coercive force on the part of their parent state. It is almost a cliché to say that the purpose of a military is to “win its nations’ wars.” Crassly expressed in the political realm, former US Governor Mike Huckabee once asserted that “[t]he purpose of the military is [to] kill people and break things.”[2] Doctrinally, the US military expresses the role of the military somewhat more civilly, as “to advance and defend US values, interests, and objectives.” This itself is an offshoot of President Harry Truman’s Executive Order 9877, which articulated five functions for the military:

1. To support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic.

2. To maintain, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions and areas vital to its interest.

3. To uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.

4. To safeguard the internal security of the United States as directed by higher authority.

5. To conduct integrated operations on the land, on the sea, and in the air necessary for these purposes.[3]

From a Canadian perspective, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) ethos, Trusted to Serve, clearly states that “(t)he defence of Canada and its interests is the Canadian Armed Forces’ primary role…the fundamental purpose…remains the lawful application of military force as requested and authorized by the Government of Canada.”[4] Its subordinate publication, Fighting Spirit: The Profession of Arms in Canada, further asserts that the key responsibility of the Department of National Defence is to “defend Canadian interests at home and abroad.”[5] The fact that the role is viewed in a defensive posture is a key element that is sometimes overlooked.

The manifestation of this purpose has evolved over time; the CAF certainly fought in wars throughout the 20th century, but that was not their only operational use. In the early part of the 20th century, Canadian military units were used to restore order in Winnipeg after a general strike began and labour unrest beset the city.[6] It would then later be used during the October Crisis in 1970 and the Oka Crisis twenty years later.[7] All three of these cases (and they were not the only ones) saw the military using coercive power, the threat or use of violence, to accomplish their aims in the domestic arena in support of legitimate civilian authority. Other instances of “aid to the civil power” included providing support in federal penitentiaries, security forces for the Montreal 1976 Olympic Games, and support to various multinational summits. What all of these have in common is that they relied upon armed force being used, or at the very least contemplated, within Canada itself. But there were also numerous cases where it was not the use of force that was relied upon; instead, it was the members of the forces themselves.

One only need look at recent Operation LENTUS deployments to see how the CAF have been used by civil society to support Canadians in crisis, and that the role of the military profession has expanded beyond what some would describe as its traditional scope. This has included evacuation of cities like Fort McMurray and Yellowknife, fighting forest fires, flood relief, the movement of ambulances, and even the provision of fresh water.[8] As a final example, during the global COVID-19 pandemic, the CAF deployed significant numbers of its people and a significant portion of its medical capabilities in support of multiple provinces and territories.[9] Taken together, Canadian history shows that the role of its military has been dynamic in nature. Notwithstanding the statements in its military doctrine, the role need not include the threat or use of force for military action to be undertaken. Lastly, a cogent argument could be made that on the domestic front, the CAF are already at work in the field of human security and operating well beyond the roles and tasks traditionally assumed by military forces.

 Do militaries, and specifically the Canadian military, need to reconsider their roles and purposes? There are two elements to this question in the Canadian context: the stated role and purpose of the CAF and its actual use. Disregarding the fact that the Canadian military has a long history of operating outside of its formally articulated role, current doctrinal publications do not list undertakings in the interest of human security as part of the raison d’etre of the CAF. Perhaps it is simply taken as a given, or as an implicit task, that members of the Canadian military will act in the human security realm. However, the lack of precision raises issues.

What roles do members of the Canadian Armed Forces think that they exist to perform? If they refer to their doctrine, they see one set of answers. If they look at their recent and historical lived experience, they may see another. Similarly, one only need examine the organization, structure, and equipment of the Canadian military to see a disconnect. Looking at the ships, aircraft, and heavy equipment of the units and formations that make up the CAF, one can discern that it is designed for the use of force. But the reality is that the military is called upon at an ever-increasing frequency to act in ways for which it is arguably ill-equipped, and probably less than optimally organized, trained, or educated. If the expectation is that the CAF must be able to respond to domestic issues that impact human security, should that not at the very least mean that the expectation is clearly articulated in its doctrine? Should it not also mean that units and organizations are created with that purpose in mind? If one accepts that form follows function, then should that function not be identified from the outset?

Some will of course argue that it is the inherent capabilities of the CAF and its people that make it possible for it, and them, to respond as well as they have in the past, in spite of being organized around a fundamentally different purpose. This might be true, and it might be good enough in a domestic environment. But would it still hold true in an international crisis? Would it work in a situation where they were working to prevent conflict? These questions do demand a reassessment of the role and purpose of the Canadian military. It is a discussion that needs to be had considering the evolving security environment and the complex needs of human security, which brings us to the subject of implications.

To be clear, the purpose of this chapter is not to argue that the Canadian military needs to expand its roles, nor constrain them. What is argued, however, is that the stated and actual roles need to be aligned.

If one accepts that the role of the military in society is limited to those activities that rely on coercive force in support of the national interest, then this would mean that activities that do not support this role should not be undertaken. It would demand an organizational structure, and the equipment, necessitated by this singular focus. This would also have implications for other agencies and the various governments within Canada.

Succinctly put, the demands of human security would still need to be met. This might mean that new “human security” agencies focused on the seven threats—some of which the CAF is poorly postured to address in the first place—would have to be created (or reinforced) by the provinces or the Government of Canada. For example, should we need to create a development agency to tackle the problems of economic, community, and political security? Would we need to create a national health agency that can address both domestic and international crises? This might mean expanding the activities and portfolios of Public Safety or the Public Health Agency of Canada. Equally, our environmental agencies might need new powers or organizations enabled and optimized to act in a crisis.

Conversely, if one accepts the argument that the role of the CAF has changed, and that the military profession is expected to do far more in the realm of human security (beyond the straightforward use of force in the achievement of national aims), then that too raises issues. Does this mean that there will have to be different forces optimized for each of the roles, or will the CAF elect to retain the status quo in its makeup? Are there elements within the human security domain where the CAF will not try to play a role? At the very least, there should be a discussion at the strategic level of where different agencies will play their part, and what functions they will contribute in order to achieve the overall effect that is desired. This could have the benefit of forcing a degree of strategic calculus to take place, creating an orchestration of the instruments of national power.

This could have implications for the very terms of service by which military members are engaged in the military. Perhaps Canada would benefit from a model where some members elect to undertake only missions where the use of force is not part of the mission set, while others elect to specialize in operations where use of force is either expected or required. While this might seem somewhat farcical, the utility of using force in the attainment of national interests is not an idea that all Canadians subscribe to. Catering to this reality by changing the conditions of employment and the structure of the organization, even within the military, is not far-fetched and has been seen in the past.[10]

Regardless of how the CAF structured itself to meet the demands of supporting human security in the field, one would have to expect training and education would be impacted. A split role of both defence and human security would mean that relevant skill sets would have to be taught and practiced. Given the limited time that is presently available for such an undertaking, and the near constant demand signal for CAF members to deploy on both types of operations, finding the time to adequately cover both sets of material will likely be a friction point; at the very least, it will demand ruthless prioritization of efforts if they are to avoid being poorly prepared for either contingency.

Lastly, there is the question of what Canadians expect their military to do on their behalf. What do they believe the CAF exists to do? The myth of peacekeeping has a powerful draw on the minds of the Canadian public. Given recent Operation LENTUS deployments, it is not unreasonable to anticipate that a similar myth, that of domestic response in support of human security tasks, is in the process of being created. The growth of this idea will have a significant detrimental impact on the ability of the CAF to carry out its currently stated purpose.

The idea of human security is not new. However, it does not appear that as a profession our military has considered what that might mean for its ability to carry out its primary role. With the CAF having become an “easy button,” as opposed to a “force of last resort,” in the realm of domestic response, the adverse impacts on readiness levels are going to continue to accrue. It is time to acknowledge that investing in human security means the evolution of the CAF, one way or another.

End Notes:

[1] UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 1994. Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security. New York. Available at Human Development Report 1994 | Human Development Reports. This report is the one of the first articulations of the idea that human security needs to address seven threats – economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political. This report also first mentions the complimentary ideas of “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want.”

[2] As cited by M.L Cavanaugh, “The Military’s Purpose is Not to Kill People and Break Things” in War on the Rocks The Military’s Purpose is Not to Kill People and Break Things, 26 Aug 2015.

[3] Executive Order 9877—Functions of the Armed Forces | The American Presidency Project.

[4] Trusted to Serve, p. 5.

[5] Fighting Spirit, p. 11.

[6] Bloody Saturday: 1919 strike turns deadly | CBC News.

[7] See October Crisis | The Canadian Encyclopedia and The Oka Crisis | VALOUR CANADA .

[8] Operation LENTUS - Canada.ca.

[9] Operation LASER - Canada.ca.

[10] During the Second World War, the National Resources Mobilization Act of 1940, created a model where Canadian conscripts were only conscripted for service within Canada and its territorial waters and could not be compelled to undertake offensive operations overseas. National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940 - Wikisource, the free online library accessed on 5 May 2025. For further details see J.L. Granatstein, “ The Mobilization Men” Legion: Canada’s Military History Magazine 20 January 2025 at The mobilization men - Legion Magazine .